What’s in a Soldier? How to Rebrand the Canadian Armed Forces

[tomahawk6]

Start with conscription and then a law that will enable reservists to be deployed as units overseas. Current unit leaders might not be up to snuff so Regulars might be needed to backfill these reserve units. We found this to be necessary prior to Desert Storm. But these were cured by adding Regulars to Guard units.

 

[mariomike]

Start with conscription

We haven't had that since the war.

 

[FJAG]

Start with conscription and then a law that will enable reservists to be deployed as units overseas. Current unit leaders might not be up to snuff so Regulars might be needed to backfill these reserve units. We found this to be necessary prior to Desert Storm. But these were cured by adding Regulars to Guard units.

Our existing laws already allow us to deploy reserve individuals or units or formations as entities.

Unfortunately our existing structure means that most reserve units have an establishment of approximately 25-50 percent of their regular counterparts, have had little to no collective training and have none of the heavy equipment needed for deployment.  :facepalm:

There's a serious reality gap between what our legislation contemplates and what our practical capabilities are vis a vis reserve units.

Had a quick look at the Greek Army after a post in another thread and noted that with half of our defence budget, the Greeks have a mixed conscripted/professional army of 100,000, with a reserve capable of expanding to 750,000 with the equipment for 1 infantry, 3 mechanized and 1 armoured division plus an additional Corps headquarters with 3 infantry and one mechanized brigades. From a gunner's point of view I have to say they 23 battalions of M109s are nice. 

:stirpot:

 

[tomahawk6]

thanks for the clarification.The greeks might have to fight the turks,but their army might make a good model for Canada.

 

[MilEME09]

Our existing laws already allow us to deploy reserve individuals or units or formations as entities.

Unfortunately our existing structure means that most reserve units have an establishment of approximately 25-50 percent of their regular counterparts, have had little to no collective training and have none of the heavy equipment needed for deployment.  :facepalm:

There's a serious reality gap between what our legislation contemplates and what our practical capabilities are vis a vis reserve units.

Had a quick look at the Greek Army after a post in another thread and noted that with half of our defence budget, the Greeks have a mixed conscripted/professional army of 100,000, with a reserve capable of expanding to 750,000 with the equipment for 1 infantry, 3 mechanized and 1 armoured division plus an additional Corps headquarters with 3 infantry and one mechanized brigades. From a gunner's point of view I have to say they 23 battalions of M109s are nice. 

:stirpot:

We don't even have enough weapons to properly put the PRes, let along heavy equipment. Most units do not have what they should above basic rifles. Recovery assets have been allowed to rust, as have light MRT capabilities (the new Mack trucks in my opinion are too big to use as anything but a heavy MRT). If we want a deployable reserve we also need them to bring their own kit.

 

[dapaterson]

Kit problems are not unique to the PRes.

 

[MilEME09]

Kit problems are not unique to the PRes.

Nope they are not, when any element needs to Rob Peter to pay Paul just to go on EX, we are failing.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Agreed, as discussed else where, the PRes especially, but the CAF as a whole has a crisis of purpose right now. We have no goal or end state, no white paper saying we must have a brigade group ready and able to deploy anywhere.

I'm not sure the entire CAF has a crisis of purpose;  the RCAF and RCN seem to busy with FG and FE.  The RCN has multiple CPFs and at least one MCDV deployed on operations.  RCAF fleets and Sqns are doing their business.  Example:  https://www.facebook.com/CAFOperations/photos/a.395987090428612/3975735069120445/

The C Army has 500ish troops deployed to Latvia (sustained op).

Is the 'crisis of purpose' really more an Army Res issue that you see in your unit lines/CBG?

Are there no HR elements in the C Army?

 

[MJP]

Agreed, as discussed else where, the PRes especially, but the CAF as a whole has a crisis of purpose right now. We have no goal or end state, no white paper saying we must have a brigade group ready and able to deploy anywhere.

That is patently wrong, SSE has clear outputs each elements has to be ready to FG. In addition we have NATO remits that we observe. The latter is is the reason 3 Div is punching back in Road to HR and then holding for a year as "NATO ready Bde" essentially.  The argument might be made that the SSE outputs are not achievable but to say we have no end state or direction would be wrong.

 

[MilEME09]

I'm not sure the entire CAF has a crisis of purpose;  the RCAF and RCN seem to busy with FG and FE.  The RCN has multiple CPFs and at least one MCDV deployed on operations.  RCAF fleets and Sqns are doing their business.  Example:  https://www.facebook.com/CAFOperations/photos/a.395987090428612/3975735069120445/

The C Army has 500ish troops deployed to Latvia (sustained op).

Is the 'crisis of purpose' really more an Army Res issue that you see in your unit lines/CBG?

Are there no HR elements in the C Army?

I can only speak for my own observations but the way I see it, we have a few missions yes. However behind those missions does the CAF have a laid out goal or desired end state laid out by policy directives? Last time I saw that was the white paper in the 90s, CFDS and SSE don't really set out what the CAF needs to do, more buzz words and a shopping list.

Let me put it another way, If those missions disappeared over night what would our specific desired end state be?

 

[FJAG]

That is patently wrong, SSE has clear outputs each elements has to be ready to FG. In addition we have NATO remits that we observe. The latter is is the reason 3 Div is punching back in Road to HR and then holding for a year as "NATO ready Bde" essentially.  The argument might be made that the SSE outputs are not achievable but to say we have no end state or direction would be wrong.

I wouldn't say "patently wrong" at all.

While SSE has eight core missions, its requirement for concurrent operations does not call for a brigade, just two sustained and one time limited deployments of 500-1,500 troops and two sustained and one time limited deployment of 100-500 troops. Notionally if one stripped all the Air Force and Navy commitments out of that they could aggregate to a brigade sized deployment but you and I both know that wasn't the intent.

I'm not sure what 3 Div's idea of a "NATO ready brigade" is at all. There is no tasking for that within the SSE although I'll be the first to admit that the idea of 3 Div forming a "NATO ready brigade" is an excellent idea. However, I expect that when 1 CMBG reaches it's year of High Readiness then it will have two of it's battlegroups eaten up with the Latvian eFP Battlegroup rotations while the rest of the brigade is decimated and cannibalised to fill the other operational deployments. There will hardly be any "brigade" left to act as a "NATO ready brigade".

More importantly, if 3 Div does manage to cobble together enough disparate elements to actually form a brigade what is it's designated mission other than a generic "NATO" one and more importantly how will it get itself to wherever NATO needs it. What is the plan? Will the US supply shipping and air movements? Do we have civilian transport earmarked and available? Do we have liaison established with whatever division or corps we intend to deploy to?

Yes we do have NATO remits. Yes the SSE recognizes that Russia is a potential adversary and that we must be capable of "maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a “near-peer"". SSE is schizophrenic at best as between the hyperbole it spouts and the limited missions it assigns. However, there is no direction for a "NATO ready brigade". Far from it--all that is required is battlegroups. Even worse is that under the current readiness management system that we have, the equipment issues that we have, the personnel issues that we have, the ability to create such a brigade and to deploy it operationally is beyond our abilities. (Which is why I expect the SSE was written to only require battlegroups in the first place)

The trouble for me, and I expect for MilEME09 as well is that a "white Paper" like the SSE purports to be, should be aspirational. It should be an analysis of the country's security needs and a road map telling DND what it should build towards. SSE doesn't do that. It spouts the usual platitudes and then basically says "do the best you can with what you have - Oh and maybe there will be a few new ships and maybe, if you are really good, some new second hand fighters in the future." I exaggerate obviously. But not by much.

Canada has dug itself into a hole where for its annual investment of 20 plus billion dollars annually, it sees very few concrete defence outputs. Not only are we "failing" - we have in fact failed and are not even trying to fix the systemic problems that permeate the entire system. Rebranding (and recruiting) are but one sign.

:cheers:

 

[MJP]

:highjack:

I wouldn't say "patently wrong" at all.

I think it is disingenuous to say we don't have something that lists outputs when in fact we do, the validity of SSE and the fact that it does suffer from a lack of "white paperness" doesn't eliminate the fact that outputs are defined.

I'm not sure what 3 Div's idea of a "NATO ready brigade" is at all. There is no tasking for that within the SSE although I'll be the first to admit that the idea of 3 Div forming a "NATO ready brigade" is an excellent idea. However, I expect that when 1 CMBG reaches it's year of High Readiness then it will have two of it's battlegroups eaten up with the Latvian eFP Battlegroup rotations while the rest of the brigade is decimated and cannibalised to fill the other operational deployments. There will hardly be any "brigade" left to act as a "NATO ready brigade".

More importantly, if 3 Div does manage to cobble together enough disparate elements to actually form a brigade what is it's designated mission other than a generic "NATO" one and more importantly how will it get itself to wherever NATO needs it. What is the plan? Will the US supply shipping and air movements? Do we have civilian transport earmarked and available? Do we have liaison established with whatever division or corps we intend to deploy to?

Yes we do have NATO remits. Yes the SSE recognizes that Russia is a potential adversary and that we must be capable of "maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a “near-peer"". SSE is schizophrenic at best as between the hyperbole it spouts and the limited missions it assigns. However, there is no direction for a "NATO ready brigade". Far from it--all that is required is battlegroups. Even worse is that under the current readiness management system that we have, the equipment issues that we have, the personnel issues that we have, the ability to create such a brigade and to deploy it operationally is beyond our abilities. (Which is why I expect the SSE was written to only require battlegroups in the first place)

I wasn't super clear but 3 Div won't be consumed because 2 Div will be the HR Div and will go on those missions, 3 Div will essentially hold in readiness for contingency. IIRC we were filling our NATO remit for a "Bde/BG Group" through the HR Div but it fell into the issue that you've described in that it was consumed FGing for named missions and would not be able to FG a Bde/BG for NATO as it was depleted.  Hence the dual road to HR divs this year with 3 Div holding until summer 22 to be "consumed"

Don't get me wrong I think it is hilarious to think we could push any more than a token force out fast as we barely have enough equipment to keep the ship going as it is. We already massively move equipment around just to ensure trg can be conducted. On top of that we have a number of deficiencies that would need to be filled in for by allies to make any BG/Bde useable.


This likely needs to be hived off as it isn't about branding anymore.

 

[daftandbarmy]

:highjack:



I think it is disingenuous to say we don't have something that lists outputs when in fact we do, the validity of SSE and the fact that it does suffer from a lack of "white paperness" doesn't eliminate the fact that outputs are defined.
I wasn't super clear but 3 Div won't be consumed because 2 Div will be the HR Div and will go on those missions, 3 Div will essentially hold in readiness for contingency. IIRC we were filling our NATO remit for a "Bde/BG Group" through the HR Div but it fell into the issue that you've described in that it was consumed FGing for named missions and would not be able to FG a Bde/BG for NATO as it was depleted.  Hence the dual road to HR divs this year with 3 Div holding until summer 22 to be "consumed"

Don't get me wrong I think it is hilarious to think we could push any more than a token force out fast as we barely have enough equipment to keep the ship going as it is. We already massively move equipment around just to ensure trg can be conducted. On top of that we have a number of deficiencies that would need to be filled in for by allies to make any BG/Bde useable.


This likely needs to be hived off as it isn't about branding anymore.

'Easy pickings' is a brand. It was the kid that always got beaten up at recess

 

[Eye In The Sky]

I can only speak for my own observations but the way I see it, we have a few missions yes. However behind those missions does the CAF have a laid out goal or desired end state laid out by policy directives? Last time I saw that was the white paper in the 90s, CFDS and SSE don't really set out what the CAF needs to do, more buzz words and a shopping list.

I think the issue, then, might be what is in your left and right of arc's and what you 'see' inside those arcs.  The CAF always has end state;  BPT defend Canada and Canadian interests around the globe, BPT to assist Canadians here at home.  Is that a simplified version?  Certainly is.  Call it a standing "implied task", even without a White Paper, SSE...all that stuff.

Let me put it another way, If those missions disappeared over night what would our specific desired end state be?

Continue to FG, continue to prepare for OP NEXT. Regenerate forces/units that have had a high op tempo during the operations that just "poof" went away.

Again...simplified version but...if the current op's " go away over night"...OP NEXT is just around the corner;  history has proven that. 

 

[MilEME09]

I think the issue, then, might be what is in your left and right of arc's and what you 'see' inside those arcs.  The CAF always has end state;  BPT defend Canada and Canadian interests around the globe, BPT to assist Canadians here at home.  Is that a simplified version?  Certainly is.  Call it a standing "implied task", even without a White Paper, SSE...all that stuff.

Continue to FG, continue to prepare for OP NEXT. Regenerate forces/units that have had a high op tempo during the operations that just "poof" went away.

Again...simplified version but...if the current op's " go away over night"...OP NEXT is just around the corner;  history has proven that.

Fair point, my knowledge of SSE, CFDS and other's is based on everything publications available publicly. As FJAG put much better then I did, we lack a road map from our policy, as a result its upto NDHQ to create its own. Competing priorities makes that difficult.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

You original statement, though, was the entire CAF has a crisis of purpose, including since SSE was produced (June 2017).  I just want to point out that the C Army is one part of the CAF, and the Pres world you serve in is just one part of that as well.  Down at the 'microscopic' level, things can look bleak and looking "up" can be challenging, more so looking "across".

I'm not going to comment on the C Army part of SSE etc;  I left the green DEU behind almost a decade and a half ago and am only an 'amateur observing' army topics these days.  I'm fairly stove-piped into RCAF operations and particularly those that involve the maritime battlespace, support to naval operations.  I've missed lots of family events since SSE was released, so I can attest that some of the RCAF operational units certainly have a purpose, and I've been 'away' and looking at RCN ships and crews on my sensors, and in some pretty far away places like the East China Sea.  I'll quote a few parts of SSE that I think say lots in a few words:

4. Global context

Evolving balance of power

- China is a rising economic power with an increasing ability to project influence globally.

- Russia has proven its willingness to test the international security environment. A degree of major power competition has returned to the international system.

Implications for Canada of a changing security environment

- To keep pace, Canada must develop advanced space and cyber capabilities

- Acknowledging rising international interest in the Arctic, Canada must enhance its ability to operate in the North

 

[Halifax Tar]

You original statement, though, was the entire CAF has a crisis of purpose, including since SSE was produced (June 2017).  I just want to point out that the C Army is one part of the CAF, and the Pres world you serve in is just one part of that as well.  Down at the 'microscopic' level, things can look bleak and looking "up" can be challenging, more so looking "across".

I'm not going to comment on the C Army part of SSE etc;  I left the green DEU behind almost a decade and a half ago and am only an 'amateur observing' army topics these days.  I'm fairly stove-piped into RCAF operations and particularly those that involve the maritime battlespace, support to naval operations.  I've missed lots of family events since SSE was released, so I can attest that some of the RCAF operational units certainly have a purpose, and I've been 'away' and looking at RCN ships and crews on my sensors, and in some pretty far away places like the East China Sea.  I'll quote a few parts of SSE that I think say lots in a few words:

EITS I really appreciate your responses in this thread.  We are terrible for forgetting there is more than the Army in the CAF.

 

[GR66]

Possibly a reason that the Army has a crisis of purpose that doesn't seem evident in the RCN or RCAF is that Canada and the US are in effect an island state that no land army has any hope of invading.  The Navy and Air Force have a obvious and direct role in keeping any military threats at a distance from the island (and protecting our movements to and from the island) while our Army deployments generally serve to bolster our broader political goals and alliances.  While they may be highly desirable and beneficial to Canada, as noted elsewhere up-thread they could technically be considered "optional". 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

For the Reserves, the on again, off again about making it a Civil Defense force is utter poison. People join the Reserves to do stuff different than their day job or average life. Marketing, equipment and purpose all play a much more significant role in recruiting and retention. Particularly as there is no contract holding them into place. 

 

[Old Sweat]

For the Reserves, the on again, off again about making it a Civil Defense force is utter poison. People join the Reserves to do stuff different than their day job or average life. Marketing, equipment and purpose all play a much more significant role in recruiting and retention. Particularly as there is no contract holding them into place.

In the 50s we restructured the Reserves into a national survival force to conduct post-nuclear strike recovery operations. The military side, getting to train on war fighting equipment, was discarded in favour of what was derisively referred to as "snakes and ladders". Military training is transferable to other tasks, but the opposite is not true.