Opinion - Liberators of the Netherlands in 1945, today... - CBC

[dimsum]

Liberators of the Netherlands in 1945, today Canada's Armed Forces are eclipsed by Dutch military
Social Sharing

Tide has reversed in terms of military capability for defence, peacekeeping, disaster-relief operations

The people of the Netherlands keep the memory of the Canadian-led liberation of their country alive with a celebration every May 5, but here in Canada we should hang our heads in embarrassment as the 75th anniversary is marked this year.

Why? From the perspective of military capability for defence, peacekeeping and disaster-relief operations, the tide in 2020 has effectively turned between liberator and liberated.

Today the Dutch military — on land, sea, and in the air — is better equipped and technologically superior to the country that fought so hard to win back their independence.

Multiple Canadian Army divisions, including hundreds of Canadian-built and manned tanks, fought their way at great cost through the highly urbanized, obstacle-rich Netherlands in 1945.

Fast-forward to 2020, and Canada's mobile land defence is supported by 80 aging Leopard tanks, many of which are second-hand purchases from, yes, the Netherlands!

Today's Dutch military also complements its newer tanks and armoured vehicles with a fleet of 28 recently upgraded, heavily armed AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopters, forming part of the country's Defence Helicopter Command.

Canada has no attack helicopter capability, and our modern martial weakness relative to our Dutch allies was made obvious during peacekeeping operations in Mali in 2018.

We had to quickly "soup up" our old fleet of unarmed Griffon utility/transport helicopters with improvised machine guns, so that it could have at least some semblance of the combat capability of the heavily armed Dutch and German helicopters we were replacing on that peacekeeping mission.

And when it comes to costly multi-role fighter jets, the Netherlands is also outdoing Canada. While Canada has indefinitely delayed its planned purchase of new F-35 Stealth Fighters, choosing instead to buy old, second-hand F-18s from Australia, the Royal Netherlands Air Force is in the process of replacing its old F-16 jets with 37 new F-35s.

Likewise, when meeting the challenge of protecting ground forces and civilians from air attack, the Dutch are also dominating the sky.

In 2012, the Conservative government under Stephen Harper finally euthanized Canada's sickly ground air-defence capability, retiring the last of our ineffective, outdated air-defence batteries. Canada still hasn't supplied our military with replacements.

Meanwhile, the Dutch military currently has three air defence batteries armed with recently upgraded, American-built MIM-104 Patriot Long Range Surface-to-Air Missiles. An additional three batteries of the Royal Netherlands Army's Air Defence Command operate modern FIM-92 Stinger platforms and NASAMS II Surface-to-Air missiles, as well as supporting airspace monitoring systems.

Out at sea, whether it be destroyers, patrol craft, or support ships, the Royal Netherlands Navy is now protecting the world's 99th longest coastline with different types of recently constructed, better armed and equipped ships, all of which have been built by the Dutch themselves.

Canada, with the largest coastline in the world, has (after incessant delays) built one of four lightly armed, not-yet-fully-operational Arctic patrol craft. Quite an event, as it's the first military ship built for Canada in 25 years.

Compare that to the Dutch who, in 2013 alone, completed four Holland-Class coastal patrol vessels. The same number that Canada, a coastal behemoth, feels it needs to secure its maritime martial dignity under the U.S. defence umbrella.

Nonetheless, Canada has commenced bold — at least by Canadian standards — plans to eventually replace its fleet of 12 early 1990s-vintage frigates by the early 2040s (no, that is not a typo), when the oldest Canadian warship will be nearly 50.

Meanwhile, the tiny Netherlands has, in the past few years, been replacing its aging warships, beginning with four modern missile defence destroyers (De Zeven Provincien class vessels) that were completed in 2005 and are being further upgraded.

Missing from Canada's fleet is any equivalent to the two Dutch Rotterdam-Class amphibious transport ships completed in 2007, or their purpose-built joint support ship completed in 2015.

That is, unless you think we should take pride in including the second-hand civilian container ship MV Asterix that Canada has leased and is trying to pass off as a Naval Support Ship.

So to recap, here's where things stand in 2020:

Modern, purpose-built naval ships: The Netherlands 11, Canada one.
New fighter jets: The Netherlands 37, Canada zero.
Originally designed, non-improvised attack helicopters: The Netherlands 28, Canada zero.
Operational air defence batteries: The Netherlands six, Canada zero.

But hey, a big thank you to the Dutch for selling us their old tanks, eh!

May 5, 1945. Lest we forget?

https://www.cbc.ca/news/opinion/opinion-canadian-military-preparedness-netherlands-liberation-1.5548372

 

[Ralph]

Apples and kumquats. He left out who some of the NLD brigades report to...

 

[CBH99]

In many ways, he's comparing Apples to Oranges in a very biased way.  Although they do seem to have a more sensible procurement system (who doesn't?), their geography also places different demands on their military also.



While I don't disagree that they obviously have an attack helicopter capability that we don't...saying we had to install 'improvised machine guns' on the Griffon is absurd. 

^ They have gatling guns & machine guns on the doors, which actually allows them to engage ground targets (soft) infinitely quicker than a dedicated attack helo.  Is it a dedicated attack helo?  No, and couldn't engage tanks or slug it out with enemy armour formations - we would need an actual attack helo for that.  Does it do the job in providing escort for chinooks or armed overwatch?  Yes.

The tanks we have aren't really aging.  They are Leopard 2A4, which are amongst some of the most modern in the world.  The differences between the 2A4 and 2A6 aren't groundbreaking.  They were purchased from mothballed stocks, completely refurbished and updated, in the late 2000's - not considered aging at all.



He also forgets to mention that the Canadian CH-147F is amongst the most modern in the world.

He forgets to mention the Army just got 550 new Lav 6.0.  We also purchased an additional 360 vehicles recently to replace support variants.

He forgets to mention the Army also got 500 new TAPV

He forgets to mention the Army is using the M777 for deployment.  (Might not be suitable for future warfare scenarios...but the US Army, USMC, British Army, Australians, and us - are in the same boat in that regard)

He forgets to mention that our fighter purchase, which we all think will be the F-35, will be 88 jets compared to their 37.  (Since he's comparing numbers.)

He forgets to mention the purchase of 5 C-17's, and 17 new C-130J Hercules aircraft to update/replace our transport fleet.



While it is true we do need to generate an AD capability for deployed forces, up until the last few years it wasn't deemed a priority.  Afghanistan placed a much higher priority on the Chinooks, MRAP vehicles, replacing the LAV fleet, etc.  There was no need for us at the time, given budget considerations, to pursue any sort of AD capability.  The Dutch on the other hand, did require a long range, high-end system such as the Patriot due to their geography and support of their Nordic defense agreements.



He isn't wrong about the naval shipbuilding aspect.  The Dutch have treated their shipbuilding programs as an extension of their industrial might, while we have dithered on 'designing' an already designed ship, etc etc. 

The Dutch, by nature of where they are, also have more demands placed on them by their neighbors to provide to a deterrent against nearby Russia.  We have the luxury of being a gigantic country with not much in it, far away from the rest of the world on this 'isolated island' of sorts. 

^ Between satellites, NORAD radar & surveillance systems, etc - we can see Russian jets approaching our airspace LONG before they actually enter, or get anywhere close to population centers.  Many of the countries in northern Europe don't have that luxury.  (Not an excuse on our part to always dither on procurement...simply pointing out that their geography demands them to be more competent in procurement.)


I don't disagree with everything he said, but as a guy with a Masters in War Studies, currently studying law, and a former member of 20yrs - I also didn't expect him to write something so biased & dumb.    :2c:

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Already posted;  apologies!

 

[FJAG]

The tanks we have aren't really aging.  They are Leopard 2A4, which are amongst some of the most modern in the world.  The differences between the 2A4 and 2A6 aren't groundbreaking.  They were purchased from mothballed stocks, completely refurbished and updated, in the late 2000's - not considered aging at all.

Turkish Leo IIA4 had problems in Syria and Turkey is clamouring for upgrades: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/germanys-leopard-2-tank-was-considered-one-the-best-until-it-24234 The Leopard IIA7 and A7+ is the current versions being fielded. The A4s were primarily manufactured in the late 1980s.

He forgets to mention the Army just got 550 new Lav 6.0.  We also purchased an additional 360 vehicles recently to replace support variants.

The Dutch have mechanized battalions which in 2008 acquired 193 Swedish CV9035NLs supported by 200 Boxers.

He forgets to mention the Army also got 500 new

And some day we'll find a proper use for those hulking beasts. The Dutch have some 400 Fenneks which come in reconnaissance, anti-tank, air defence, forward observer, mortar, forward air controller versions. The Fennek is 6 feet high compared to the 11 foot TAPV.

He forgets to mention the Army is using the M777 for deployment.  (Might not be suitable for future warfare scenarios...but the US Army, USMC, British Army, Australians, and us - are in the same boat in that regard)

The Dutch have 57 PzH2000 self propelled guns which they also deployed to Afghanistan plus some 128 81mm and 145 120 mm mortars.

He forgets to mention that our fighter purchase, which we all think will be the F-35, will be 88 jets compared to their 37.  (Since he's comparing numbers.)

He forgets to mention the purchase of 5 C-17's, and 17 new C-130J Hercules aircraft to update/replace our transport fleet.

Fair enough although I'll believe we'll get F 35s (regardless of the number) when they are finally approved (probably several years after they lay Trudeau to rest. As for the transport aircraft, one should note that the Netherlands is about 40,000 sq kilometers which is a little over 2/3rds of the size of Nova Scotia. There's no major need for a significant air transport fleet.

While it is true we do need to generate an AD capability for deployed forces, up until the last few years it wasn't deemed a priority.  Afghanistan placed a much higher priority on the Chinooks, MRAP vehicles, replacing the LAV fleet, etc.  There was no need for us at the time, given budget considerations, to pursue any sort of AD capability.  The Dutch on the other hand, did require a long range, high-end system such as the Patriot due to their geography and support of their Nordic defense agreements.

I think that you need to reread that paragraph. I've read the 1994 White Paper on Defence and the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy which governed our strategy during these years. In particular the 1994 policy which was in effect during our early years in Afghanistan stated:

the Canadian Forces will remain prepared to deploy on UN operations contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft. Were these forces to be deployed simultaneously, this could conceivably involve in the order of 10,000 military personnel.
...
The Government's perspective on NATO underpins the future of Canada's Alliance commitments. In the event of a crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces that Canada will maintain for all multilateral operations would immediately be made available to NATO. Should it prove necessary, Canada would mobilize further national resources to provide the additional forces required to fulfil Canada's commitment to the Alliance as set out under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In effect government direction was to prepare for up to a brigade group + one battalion size deployment in support of the UN or NATO. Nothing in there stated that we were to divest ourselves of tanks, self propelled artillery, anti-tank capabilities or air defence. Those were choices made within DND based on risk assessments made at the time. In effect, the Russian Bear at the time looked cuddly while the dirty terrorists had blown up two buildings in New York therefore we committed ourselves whole-hog to asymmetric warfare in the belief that deterrence in Europe was no longer needed and that we could divest ourselves of all the key weapon systems that were necessary to survive in a near peer conflict. These were not choosing priorities, it was making trade-offs. We could have gotten everything necessary for Afghanistan and still maintained our peer to peer capabilities if we hadn't at the same time put a priority on a massive build-up of our national headquarters during the 2004 to 2011 period:

The total number of personnel in Headquarters above the level of Brigade, Wing and Fleet grew by 4,803 people, an increase of 46 %.

Another way to look at this: personnel serving in higher Headquarters’ grew at a rate four times faster than the overall CF Regular Force over the same six year period.

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/report-on-transformation-2011.html

In short we gave up key warfighting equipment to support a full brigade of paper pushers in Ottawa. That's where our priorities were.

I don't disagree with everything he said, but as a guy with a Masters in War Studies, currently studying law, and a former member of 20yrs - I also didn't expect him to write something so biased & dumb.    :2c:

Let's not forget one key point here: The Netherlands' 2019 Defence Budget was US$12.4 Billion; Canada's was US$22.4 Billion, almost twice as much. Their army is about the same size as ours (although they have more equipment with even more in war readiness reserve storage). Their navy and air forces are admittedly smaller because their need is less, however, I have to agree with you that there is an apple and orange element here which is that the Dutch seem to be generating significantly better defence outputs for the defence dollar inputs that they commit as a nation.

I think that at the end of the day, that's what Smol is saying. We spend a lot on defence but, because of poor decisions, our combat capabilities are not what they should be for today's putative enemies and after all, isn't that what we expect from our defence leadership; to prepare us for our next conflict. Sorry mate. I can't agree with you. His report is not biased or dumb. What you should consider it is, though provoking.

:cheers:

 

[CBH99]

FJAG,

I always appreciate the good back & forth with you, and I definitely appreciate you having a much more applicable knowledge in key areas.

You are right about what you stated above - all of it. 

I think what the article is missing is context, and perhaps that is simply because the author had a word limit.


Most countries tend to get more bang for their defense buck, literally, than we do.  Vehicles, aircraft, ships are purchased to FIGHT & DESTROY the enemy, with other duties being secondary.  I find that we tend to approach equipment, most of the time, with the opposite mindset...it's there for domestic use, or contributing to allied operations, with warfighting being the final checkmark.  (Obviously I don't mean this universally -- however, I do agree that they do tend to get more bang for their defense buck.  Same with the Aussies.)



Turkish Leo IIA4 had problems in Syria and Turkey is clamouring for upgrades

To be fair, the Turks also employed their tanks in a way that had most people facepalming at the time.  The didn't deploy much in terms of infantry support at the time, and their tanks were picked off in way larger numbers than they should have been.

Part of this could be because of the tanks.  I think a significant factor in their losses was how they chose to employ them.  I think we discussed this at the time in a different thread, but their tanks deployed with hardly any infantry support at all.  Their field commanders obviously didn't have much experience in operating armoured forces in a non-formation, ad-hoc, COIN type operation against a well equipped enemy. 


The total number of personnel in Headquarters above the level of Brigade, Wing and Fleet grew by 4,803 people, an increase of 46 %.

Another way to look at this: personnel serving in higher Headquarters’ grew at a rate four times faster than the overall CF Regular Force over the same six year period.

That's just absurd.  How can a CDS like Vance not only ignore the problem, but seem to contribute to it?  He's a combat vet, field officer type throughout his career.  How can he not see what everybody else in the CF does?



I agree with everything you wrote.  Like I said, I think the article was missing context - which, I can understand if there was a word limit, which there probably was.

Their geography being substantially smaller, much closer to Russia, and their needs to contribute to Nordic security all seem to drive them to a more 'focused' procurement.  Instead of needing the general ability to do everything/anything, they do seem to focus their purchases and force structure with a more concrete idea of what they want to be able to achieve.



I also agree with what you said about the 1994 White Paper.

^ Again, in the context of Afghanistan, we had been there for 6 years before the 2008 White Paper was released.  During that time, the GoC and DND prioritized theatre-specific equipment that was deemed UOR, rather than following the 1994 White Paper.  Chinooks, MRAP type vehicles, Leopard 2 to replace Leopard 1, G-Wagons, upgraded uniforms & equipment for the theatre, C-17's and C-130J's to replace/enhance our transport fleet, etc.

I could very well be wrong in regards to the above statement.  It seemed to me, at the time, that the needs of the theatre completely displaced the 1994 White Paper, as the 1994 White Paper was written for a completely different scenario than what we were finding ourselves in.



I'll take back my comment about the article being biased, and the author writing something so biased and dumb.  In the context that he had a word limit, and had to summarize his key points.

I don't disagree with everything he's saying.  I just think it's important to put both sides into context.  He didn't acknowledge any of the new equipment coming online now or soon, nor did he acknowledge that we have very different 'perceived' priorities based on our geography. 

 

[FJAG]

The total number of personnel in Headquarters above the level of Brigade, Wing and Fleet grew by 4,803 people, an increase of 46 %.

Another way to look at this: personnel serving in higher Headquarters’ grew at a rate four times faster than the overall CF Regular Force over the same six year period.

That's just absurd.  How can a CDS like Vance not only ignore the problem, but seem to contribute to it?  He's a combat vet, field officer type throughout his career.  How can he not see what everybody else in the CF does?

What's even worse is that a) most of that happened on Hillier's and  Natynczyk's watch and b) Leslie report, which pointed this out, has been largely relegated to a back shelf by Natynczyk, Lawson and Vance.

... the 1994 White Paper.
^ Again, in the context of Afghanistan, we had been there for 6 years before the 2008 White Paper was released.  During that time, the GoC and DND prioritized theatre-specific equipment that was deemed UOR, rather than following the 1994 White Paper.  Chinooks, MRAP type vehicles, Leopard 2 to replace Leopard 1, G-Wagons, upgraded uniforms & equipment for the theatre, C-17's and C-130J's to replace/enhance our transport fleet, etc.

I could very well be wrong in regards to the above statement.  It seemed to me, at the time, that the needs of the theatre completely displaced the 1994 White Paper, as the 1994 White Paper was written for a completely different scenario than what we were finding ourselves in.

Actually I think that the Afghan deployment can be read within the context of the 1994 White Paper and its support and force size commitments to UN and NATO collective actions which our operation did in fact fall under. The White Paper is written broadly. Our military leadership chose to interpret it narrowly focusing almost exclusively on one theatre.

I don't begrudge the equipment commitments we made to Afghanistan either. They were appropriate and necessary and in fact corrected earlier poor decision making within the CAF (we'd gotten rid of the Chinooks we previously had owned in the 1990s and were in the process of getting rid of the tanks and SPs.) I actually don't mind the LAVs and do take into consideration that there was a strong political push to give work to GD in London and that they were bought before Afghanistan. LAVs have a good use in providing deployability, mobility and firepower in asymmetric warfare (which is why I argue that they should continue to exist in a medium brigade equipped and trained for that purpose)

I even see the utility of having them in a heavyish brigade for combat in Europe in order to reap the maintenance benefits of a common fleet within the Army. I just think that that is a trade off for lives when the shooting starts and while such a trade off might be necessary/acceptable one, our leadership should at least be honest enough to admit that's what they are doing. (The Brits' credibility was much hit with the failures of a series of their vehicles in Afghanistan)

My biggest complaint is that since the post-Soviet collapse and the 1994 White Paper (and particularly within the SSE) we have been politically directed to recognize a potential for deployment to a NATO commitment (and most recently have given that practical effect in Latvia) but ever since then Canada's military leadership has taken its eyes off that commitment/defence requirement and has knowingly sacrificed military capabilities in that environment in favour of maintaining inordinately flush headquarters during lean financial times. I know that everyone in Ottawa is highly adept at rationalizing each and every decision that they make, but to me this smacks of institutional professional negligence.

:cheers:

 

[FSTO]

Hmm..….HQ bloat continues to grow under the leadership of Army combat General Officers (and one RCAF)………..hmmm. And what service is able to operate within a define space that has zero room to accommodate hangers on...…….hmm.


Now popping smoke and jumping overboard!

 

[Good2Golf]

Hmm..….HQ bloat continues to grow under the leadership of Army combat General Officers (and one RCAF)………..hmmm. And what service is able to operate within a define space that has zero room to accommodate hangers on...…….hmm.


Now popping smoke and jumping overboard!

It’s not like the RCN just has CRCN, DCRCN and DGMEPM in NDHQ.  Careful about glass houses...if we were to ask why we had all these personnel bloat problems in the CAF, who would be the key position responsible to assist the CDS to resolve it....hmmmm...oh that’s right...a VAdm...

 

[Ralph]

It would be easier to fix things if "Ottawa" was the monolithic NDHQ Puzzle Palace that those never posted to the NCR imagine it is. There are some HQs manned to the highest level, and there are some HQs that are chronically understaffed...

 

[dapaterson]

There is fundamental indiscipline in the HHQs (L1s and L2s, particularly) in terms of O&E, and an unwillingness to stop doing anything.

If ECPs could only be requested at 5+ years out (to provide personnel generation systems time to respond) we'd see significantly different behaviours.  But as long as we indulge the desires for immediate gratification by GOFOs (and continue to grow their numbers beyond reasonable or sustainable numbers) the problems will persist.

 

[FSTO]

It’s not like the RCN just has CRCN, DCRCN and DGMEPM in NDHQ.  Careful about glass houses...if we were to ask why we had all these personnel bloat problems in the CAF, who would be the key position responsible to assist the CDS to resolve it....hmmmm...oh that’s right...a VAdm...

Oh I'm fully aware of my hypocrisy!

But Big Army has been the main drivers of all this since they are by far the largest component in the CAF, right?

 

[FJAG]

Upthread I made a comment about Turkish Leopard II A4s. Here are two more articles which offer greater detail on the matter.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/germany%E2%80%99s-leopard-2-tank-syria-was-beaten-badly-battle-why-78441

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/02/12/battle-al-bab-verifying-turkish-military-vehicle-losses/

While the manner of tactical employment may very well have been one of the issues, what strikes me as probably more significant is the fact that these tanks were facing more advanced and effective anti armour guided missiles rather than the RPG7 and IEDs which we faced in Afghanistan. This is a lessons the Americans have accepted the lessons with their current M1A2Cs which include not only their depleted uranium armour (which the Germans for some moral reason or other refuse to use) but also reactive armour plates and the Trophy Active Protective System. The Russians have been using reactive armour for some time and newer equipment is also incorporating other active protective systems.

All that said. We need not only better tanks, but also a reinforcement/replacement system that can generate quick replacement of the inevitable equipment and crew casualties we will sustain.

:cheers:

 

[CBH99]

Upthread I made a comment about Turkish Leopard II A4s. Here are two more articles which offer greater detail on the matter.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/germany%E2%80%99s-leopard-2-tank-syria-was-beaten-badly-battle-why-78441

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/02/12/battle-al-bab-verifying-turkish-military-vehicle-losses/

While the manner of tactical employment may very well have been one of the issues, what strikes me as probably more significant is the fact that these tanks were facing more advanced and effective anti armour guided missiles rather than the RPG7 and IEDs which we faced in Afghanistan. This is a lessons the Americans have accepted the lessons with their current M1A2Cs which include not only their depleted uranium armour (which the Germans for some moral reason or other refuse to use) but also reactive armour plates and the Trophy Active Protective System. The Russians have been using reactive armour for some time and newer equipment is also incorporating other active protective systems.

All that said. We need not only better tanks, but also a reinforcement/replacement system that can generate quick replacement of the inevitable equipment and crew casualties we will sustain.

:cheers:

Agreed.  We should have a mechanism in place to order replacement vehicles for those that we lose.  (No disrespect intended at all, nor to make a recent tragedy something focused on equipment, but the loss of Stalker is a good example, with only 28 airframes we should absolutely have a replacement program in place.)

What you said about the sophisticated anti-armour missiles, that is what I was referring to also.  The enemy was well equipped with modern ATGM.  The Turks employed their tanks horribly at the same time, which I believe was their # 1 mistake.  Parked on hilltops, parked at the base of hills, or just out in the open & scanning. 

There were plenty of videos on Youtube & LiveLeak of them getting picked off, and they had absolutely zero - or minimal - infantry.
  Just a tank, sitting there in the open most of the time, almost inviting an attack.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PCkbpmLZuWk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pButwecC2k8

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WMRH4GdBbuw


Ugly footage.  The 3rd link is especially damning, in how quickly Turkey lost it's tanks. 


Please note in all videos, the OPFOR were able to operate relatively freely near Turkish armoured forces.  No infantry patrols.  No patrols near what appeared to be FOB's.  Nothing.



FJAG,

Like most issues, perhaps it's a combination of multiple factors, re: the original article posted, about our aging Leopard 2A4.

From my understanding, the tank still stands up pretty well against most other tanks used by allies.  Especially in northern Europe, where most countries use the Leopard 2A4 or 2A6.

In the Turkish context, I believe their employment was their fatal flaw, not the tank itself.  We could replace the tanks in the videos with any model of tank out there, and I believe the outcome would have been the same given how they were positioned and employed. 

:2c:  :cheers:

 

[PuckChaser]

Agreed.  We should have a mechanism in place to order replacement vehicles for those that we lose.  (No disrespect intended at all, nor to make a recent tragedy something focused on equipment, but the loss of Stalker is a good example, with only 28 airframes we should absolutely have a replacement program in place.)

It would be a lot easier if we had a shortened procurement cycle where we're buying stuff with active production lines for a majority of the life of the vehicle/airframe. Should be building into the contract to deliver X number of new vehicles/airframes every X years for the first half of the anticipated useful life. Then we can stock a few in case we (thankfully) don't destroy the predicted amount, and it helps industry with a predictable number they need to deliver every so many years.

 

[suffolkowner]

some of the latest defence budget numbers

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/fs_2020_04_milex_0.pdf

We often compare ourselves to Australia but I think we come out on the wrong end of other familiar countries as well as alluded to above with respect to the Netherlands, but see Israel/Italy/Spain/Turkey all in our spending neighborhood but with vastly superior militaries, at least on paper. Does purchasing power and labor costs account for enough of the difference. This particular CDS seems to have an affinity for Brigadier Generals, at some point leadership has to be held accountable.

Our tanks actually illustrate the point well in my opinion in that we too should be proceeding with modernization/refit to the 2A7+ across the fleet

 

[MilEME09]

It would be a lot easier if we had a shortened procurement cycle where we're buying stuff with active production lines for a majority of the life of the vehicle/airframe. Should be building into the contract to deliver X number of new vehicles/airframes every X years for the first half of the anticipated useful life. Then we can stock a few in case we (thankfully) don't destroy the predicted amount, and it helps industry with a predictable number they need to deliver every so many years.

Not buying one off products would help as well, does any one else even use the Kerax 8x8 other then us? One off lines just ensure problems down the road.

 

[FJAG]

It would be a lot easier if we had a shortened procurement cycle where we're buying stuff with active production lines for a majority of the life of the vehicle/airframe. Should be building into the contract to deliver X number of new vehicles/airframes every X years for the first half of the anticipated useful life. Then we can stock a few in case we (thankfully) don't destroy the predicted amount, and it helps industry with a predictable number they need to deliver every so many years.

True enough.

My point on replacement of combat losses (or even training losses), however, is more along the lines of having immediate trained and equipped crews to replace losses, a supply chain with a plan to get them forward quickly (in the face of area denial strategies), an industry that can replace the replacements from available stocks and ultimately production lines (while the combat phase may be quick, the "cease fire" or "operational pause" may be lengthy).

:cheers:

 

[suffolkowner]

Not buying one off products would help as well, does any one else even use the Kerax 8x8 other then us? One off lines just ensure problems down the road.

And on that new vaunted non political procurement system with respect to the above

https://www.marketscreener.com/news/CITT-Canadian-International-Trade-Tribunal-OSHKOSH-DEFENSE-CANADA-INC--26592915/

 

[TCM621]

The majority of the comments that have been critical of this article seem to have how you define "aging" or "old" equipment. A lot of equipment is actually reasonably up to date in technological terms. Military equipment isn't usually cutting edge stuff. On the other hand, we have a lot of physically old stuff. Ships and planes are the most obvious with multiple planes being 30+ years old. We also beat our equipment to hell and back because we don't have any to spare.

A lot of our problems could be fixed, or at least minimized, by buying new versions of what we have now. Call up Boeing and ask for 60 CF-18s in their current configuration and we would save money on training, spares and maintenance. Replace all our hi-powers with new ones that don't rattle apart when you shot them. Build some new frigates in their newest configuration and other such things. In my career, I have run into far more things that were ineffective because they were broken than were too out of date to be useful. Upgrades are important but the best technology is useless if it is stuck on the tarmac or in the harbour.