Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense

[FJAG]

A Canadian Brigade with minimal antitank weapons, no tactical air defence, no mortars, and towed artillery against a US Armored Brigade Combat Team? The Canadian brigade would be fixed in place and cut to pieces faster than you can say Republican Guard.

You can list a lot of the lessons of modern mechanized warfare without having an expensive exercise. But those lessons aren't popular, because they imply that we need to buy more modern equipment, spend money to train with it, and that previous decisions to divist entire categories of kit were serious errors.

You could make it even more interesting and make it a National Guard Armored Brigade Combat Team like this one:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/30th_Armored_Brigade_Combat_Team#Current_organization

I'm not entirely sure but I think that this brigade alone probably have as many tanks as the entire Canadian Army. They certainly have more Infantry Fighting Vehicles, self propelled howitzers, and self propelled 120 mm mortars.

;D

 

[Infanteer]

That's an old organization of an ABCT.  The updated version has even more tanks:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_combat_team#/media/File:ABCT.png

There are 6 companies of tanks in each ABCT, and the US Army has 10 Active Duty and 5 NG ABCTs.

 

[FJAG]

That's an old organization of an ABCT.  The updated version has even more tanks:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_combat_team#/media/File:ABCT.png

There are 6 companies of tanks in each ABCT, and the US Army has 10 Active Duty and 5 NG ABCTs.

You're right. The diagram is an older one but I'm not sure that all NG ABCTs have gone to the full establishment yet (if ever - incidentally I note the diagram mentions 4 company combined arms battalions but the text discusses 3 coys) For example the 30th ABCT in North Carolina only has two manouvre battalions with a total of four tank and four Bradly companies while the 155th in Mississippi and the 1st ABCT 34 ID in Minnesota each has two mechanized combined arms bns with a total of 4 tank and 4 Bradley companies and a straight infantry bn (I think the Inf bns are not mechanized). The 116th Cavalry BCT from the Idaho/Oregon/Montana NGs has two Cavalry combined arms battalions (of two tank and two Bradley companies each). The 81st ABCT in Washington has become a Stryker brigade.

My quick review of Active Army ABCTs seems to show 3 bns of 2 + 2 Coys each.

:cheers:

 

[daftandbarmy]

Good day all,

I wanted to find a way to pass on everything I had surmised over the last 2 years. The LAV Captain is a position that is shrouded in a bit of mystery. It's treated as an Ops Capt in garrison (a good tangent is why this is wrong, in my opinion) and how to utilize him/her in the field outside of a combat team's advance-to-contact is a little up in the air.

For your reading pleasure, and any and all commentary / feedback / discussion generated from this is very much appreciated. I am particularly interested here what some of the tankers have to say.

I submitted the article to the Inf Corps Newsletter in 3 parts due to its length. I'm also posting it in 3 parts due to the topics covered, to keep the threads organized.

I'm still astonished that our doctrine has gigantic 'non-Marder/BMP type' APCs rolling up onto the objective before the troops dismount, especially given the number of RPGs in even 'third world' armies.

 

[ballz]

I'm still astonished that our doctrine has gigantic 'non-Marder/BMP type' APCs rolling up onto the objective before the troops dismount, especially given the number of RPGs in even 'third world' armies.

Dogma is.. dogmatic.

At the same time I posted these articles, I posted the one by Maj Cole Petersen addressing exactly that, so that specific discussion was being had here if you are interested.. https://army.ca/forums/threads/127041.0.html

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

A Canadian Brigade with minimal antitank weapons, no tactical air defence, no mortars, and towed artillery against a US Armored Brigade Combat Team? The Canadian brigade would be fixed in place and cut to pieces faster than you can say Republican Guard.

You can list a lot of the lessons of modern mechanized warfare without having an expensive exercise. But those lessons aren't popular, because they imply that we need to buy more modern equipment, spend money to train with it, and that previous decisions to divist entire categories of kit were serious errors.

These threads have been very interesting to read if only to reinforce my view that the Canadian Army of 2018 is much like the British Army of 1890, very good at defeating enemies armed with "sharpened bits of fruit and sticks" but not much else.

As well, we seem to have used latest engagements/wars as a form of confirmation bias. 

 

[Ostrozac]

These threads have been very interesting to read if only to reinforce my view that the Canadian Army of 2018 is much like the British Army of 1890, very good at defeating enemies armed with "sharpened bits of fruit and sticks" but not much else.

As well, we seem to have used latest engagements/wars as a form of confirmation bias.

I agree. If we intended to build a pure Counter-Insurgency army optimized for fighting poorly equipped people over extended campaigns in the world's hinterlands, we'd actually be pretty well equipped. We have leadership with Afghanistan experience, logistics and C4I systems optimized for FOBs and firebases, and plenty of overmatch for fighting an enemy using 1960's technology. In that kind of a war, self-propelled artillery, surface to air missiles, and modern anti tank missiles would indeed be expensive overkill. I think that a Canadian brigade would be comfortable conducting an operation similar to the ongoing French operation in Mali.

But instead, we have declared a national interest in conventional operations in Europe on the forward edge of NATO facing Russia. And for that task we are shockingly ill-equipped.

 

[Kirkhill]

You might want to leave the BMPs out of it.  Even Soviet dogma didn't call for "dismount on the objective".  IIRC the expectation was that we would be huddled under our SKOP kits enjoying the attentions of the Div Arty Group and every other gun and rocket in range while the Tanks and BMPs advanced on our positions behind a screen of dismounted infantry.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I agree. If we intended to build a pure Counter-Insurgency army optimized for fighting poorly equipped people over extended campaigns in the world's hinterlands, we'd actually be pretty well equipped. We have leadership with Afghanistan experience, logistics and C4I systems optimized for FOBs and firebases, and plenty of overmatch for fighting an enemy using 1960's technology. In that kind of a war, self-propelled artillery, surface to air missiles, and modern anti tank missiles would indeed be expensive overkill. I think that a Canadian brigade would be comfortable conducting an operation similar to the ongoing French operation in Mali.

But instead, we have declared a national interest in conventional operations in Europe on the forward edge of NATO facing Russia. And for that task we are shockingly ill-equipped.

You and I are pretty much of the same mind.  Look at what we are making huge investments in:  SOF, C4ISR, Int Collection Capability.  Our kit: TAPV, LAV 6.0, towed howitzers, Utility Helicopters, etc.  All great for chasing down Brigands and Bandits, not so great for fighting Armoured Divisions or even other Mechanized Infantry Divisions.

I would even say calling our Brigades Mechanized could almost be considered a stretch.

We've got a great little colonial army without any colonies to fight wars in.

 

[b00161400]

Milch is simply giving a description of the system Lossberg "created" and the General Staff codified in the First World War.  Wynne, a British official historian, figured it out after the war and his book should be on every professional's shelf.

Perhaps unsurprisingly I had a hard time finding that for a reasonable price on Amazon.de!  I got it on Amazon.ca and it'll be waiting for me on HLTA.

Words have meaning, and I think clarity is important.

A reserve is an uncommitted force that allows the commander to retain some freedom of action.  A commander without a reserve is limited to coordinating the fights of his/her subordinates, but has little to actually influence them.

Depth, as I conceive it, is rearward position that allows for some sort of mutual support of forward positions or elements.  The element in depth, in being able to provide mutual support, is somewhat vulnerable to enemy actions. A depth position may be suitable for a reserve, but the commander risks having his reserve unexpectedly committed through enemy actions (to include fires).  A key tenet of the defence in depth is that formation reserves are out of the range of enemy artillery, so as to prevent interference with the commitment of the reserve.  With modern rocket artillery systems featuring greatly extended range, this is harder to do in the modern battlefield, but there are still ways to achieve this.

This makes sense to me as well and how I've envisioned it for most of my time.  Interestingly, it doesn't exactly jive with BG in Ops.  BG in Ops puts a lot of emphasis on depth elements conducting blocking and reinforcing tasks.  A depth element who is able to provide mutual support to forward posns is significantly less likely to be well positioned to reinforce or block a penetration that isn't along its currently sited BP. 

As I think this through it seems to me that block is the actual task of a depth BP and they need to be sited along the avenue approach that the enemy is expected to take after having bypassed or penetrated lead BPs.  The lowest level at which this could happen would be Bn/BG as Coys and platoons are too small and their depth should be focussed on providing mutual sp to forward posns.

I would say no.  A properly constituted reserve probably isn't siting on the point of the main effort.  If it was, I'd question the defensive layout.  Example:

The Brigade is defending the crossing site, and for various reasons has to defend forward (there are three ways to defend a crossing site - forward, on, or behind).  The main effort is on the hills that overlooking the bridgehead area called the "O1 line" in some doctrine, the line of features from which a position can be hit with direct fire.  The Brigade Commander states that the main effort is on the ABC hill features, and that the 1st Battalion is on his main effort.  He has an Armour heavy Combat Team maintained as his reserve.  As the battle progresses, the mission has not changed, but the 1st Battalion takes a beating.  The reserve is committed to the ABC hill features to reinforce.  The sound choice is for the reserve to now fall under the 1st Battalion Commander (as the man on the spot).  While the reserve element is now on the point of main effort, neither the unit or its initial location were part of that main effort.

...or another version, the 1st Battalion's defence at the ABC hill features goes well, and the enemy Division's attack culminates.  The Brigade Commander decides to commit his reserve to counterattack and regain the initiative.  The counterattack goes in at Junction XYZ to the east of the hill features.  The Brigade Commander shifts his main effort to the Armoured Combat Team on Junction XYZ, so everyone in the Brigade knows where support needs to go.  At this point, I'd argue that the Armoured Combat Team is no longer a reserve, as it has been committed.  The Brigade Commander reforms his reserve out of two companies of the 2nd Battalion, which had been providing depth from the near side of the crossing site.

To wit, if the reserve element approaches the geographic point of main effort and assumes the role, it no longer has reserve status.

Agreed.  Seems reasonable.

 

[Red_Five]

It would odd to designate your reserve as the main effort from the outset, but it might become your main effort or be put on your main effort once committed.

Returning to terminology for a minute, the terms countermoves and reserve can be confusing. I think that we can confuse ourselves from time to time by calling a sub-unit "the countermoves force" or giving it the task of "countermoves." Lets look at a Battle Group executing a Block task with two companies up, one in depth (maybe a company minus) and a tank squadron combat team in reserve (I didn't say it was going to be imaginative...) The CO is indeed treating his tank squadron combat team as a reserve. He might use it to reinforce a threated sub-unit. He might use it block the decisive enemy penetration to meet his mission. His plan, though, does not hinge on any one task. The main effort here is likely the company on what the CO determines to be the VG for the block task.

Lets consider the same force now has the task of Destroying an enemy brigade in a given KZ ( the CO deduces that he needs to destroy two battalions).  The CO might give three companies Contain or Block tasks to keep the enemy in the KZ perhaps with some BPT Fix or Support by Fire tasks against certain enemy battalions. He then gives his tank squadron the task to Destroy two battalions in KZ PANTERA. He calls them his Countermoves force and his BG SoM calls for the tank squadron to destroy the enemy brigade with a counterattack (perhaps with several options) once it has two battalions contained in the KZ and they are fixed by indirect fire and his TUA platoon. This tank squadron, to me, is not a reserve even when it has not yet been committed because the CO's plan hinges on it executing that Destroy task. Any unforeseen enemy activity will result in the CO having to juggle on the fly, maybe with everything in contact. In this case, I think that the CO needs a reserve in addition to his Countermoves force. Maybe that reserve is the third company, giving more work to the other two but giving the CO some flexibility. Maybe its just a platoon? Maybe its a Sqn of Sappers? I would also offer in this example that the tank squadron is the main effort throughout, or at least it is on the main effort.

Regarding Bir Hacheim and Jock Columns, at the Battle of Gazala in 1942 the British 8th Army was trying to find a way to cope with superior Axis combined arms forces (even the Italians had better combined arms doctrine and organization at this point). Jock Columns were used by the Motor Companies in the Armoured Divisions, which were different than the infantry divisions. British divisions were not well organized in 1942, with combined arms really happening at Corps level instead of Division or lower. At Gazala the British (with their Commonwealth and French allies) tried to use Boxes and minefields. Each Box had an infantry brigade in them, usually with some artillery. The frontages of the desert war meant that the Boxes did not have mutual support. British armoured divisions were intended to be used to destroy axis forces that would have been fixed by the boxes. The British armour, though was tied to the Boxes but held at higher command - an unhappy compromise.

At Gazala, two of the Boxes did well. The French (in an old fort) on the far south astride a supply route held out for days. Another Box held by a British brigade also astride a supply route almost caused the defeat of Rommel. Rommel's tanks and infantry could crash through the open desert but his supplies needed some routes. British armour counterattacks were late and uncoordinated. This gave Rommel time and space to destroy the stubborn British Box (150th Brigade) and open a supply route. The rest of the British 8th Army were distant spectators in their Boxes. The rout at Gazala led to the the fall of Tobruk and another disaster at Mersa Matruh. Mutual support is not just a laundry list exam item. It actually matters!

Aukinlek at 1st Alamein tried to remedy the defects of the British organization by pushing the artillery down to give British infantry some hitting power (they really had nothing to offer in the Desert at this stage). They held on by the skin of their teeth, but this was also not a happy solution. Tank infantry cooperation was practically non-existant at this stage of the war, and perhaps hit its low point at Ruseiwat Ridge when an entire NZ brigade was captured by fairly light German armoured forces in a counterattack as a British tank brigade lay in harbour nearby.

I guess the point is that strongpoints or boxes can sometimes work if they dominate routes and you actually have a viable countermoves plan. St Vith and Bastogne at the Battle of the Bulge come to mind. Otherwise they can simply be potted plants that can be isolated and dealth with at the leisure of the attacker.

 

[Infanteer]

Returning to terminology for a minute, the terms countermoves and reserve can be confusing.

Your two examples are illustrative.  If the original plan hinges on it, its probably not a reserve, as the reserve gives you something to deal with a change to the plan!

 

[ballz]

Your two examples are illustrative.  If the original plan hinges on it, its probably not a reserve, as the reserve gives you something to deal with a change to the plan!

This is exactly what I mean when I say I can't reconcile what is stated in our doctrine with the terminology it uses.

IMO, the countermoves is going to be the most lethal part of the defensive. More importantly, it's going to be absolutely vital to ensure the enemy doesn't just bypass you or your KZ's. Without it, you're just a bunch of people sitting in a hole waiting to die, with no influence into how  the enemy attacks you and no ability to get a step ahead of them and attack them when vulnerable.

Yet our BG in Ops states that the reserves conduct countermoves, and actually refers to it as a "stage" of the MDB, implying that it is the latter part of the battle... in my opinion, this is just plain wrong. If you've got a good countermoves plan, they are likely performing a block task, perhaps multiple times, before the static position is even in direct contact.

 

[Red_Five]

This is exactly what I mean when I say I can't reconcile what is stated in our doctrine with the terminology it uses.

IMO, the countermoves is going to be the most lethal part of the defensive. More importantly, it's going to be absolutely vital to ensure the enemy doesn't just bypass you or your KZ's. Without it, you're just a bunch of people sitting in a hole waiting to die, with no influence into how  the enemy attacks you and no ability to get a step ahead of them and attack them when vulnerable.

Yet our BG in Ops states that the reserves conduct countermoves, and actually refers to it as a "stage" of the MDB, implying that it is the latter part of the battle... in my opinion, this is just plain wrong. If you've got a good countermoves plan, they are likely performing a block task, perhaps multiple times, before the static position is even in direct contact.

The countermoves might be the most lethal part of the defensive, or it might not. The defence might not even be all that lethal and still be successful. If you are tasked to Block and you are using a true Area Defence you might not even have any tanks attached to you. Maybe all you have is a reserve that could block or reinforce.

BG in Ops states that there is a covering force battle and then a main defensive battle including countermoves. The countermoves are part of the main defensive battle - they could occur near the start of the MDB (unlikely but possible), the middle or at the conclusion. BG in Ops is not prescriptive on that. You don't tend to conduct your decisive counterattack until the enemy is culminated, though, so its natural to see most countermoves actions towards the end of the MDB.

The covering force battle is defining the enemy, maybe shaping him and shielding the main defence from premature disclosure. It might also be buying time for preparations. The reserve might be used during the covering force battle, but that means something went really sideways for you or the enemy!

A covering force combat team fighting a delay or guard battle is probably in constant motion, but they are not the countermoves. Now, you might decide to fight your main defensive battle as a mobile defence (or have no choice). Then you will likely have two or three mobile elements fixing the enemy to allow the "countermoves" to strike.

I don't like being static as a tanker, but don't throw away the area defence as an infantryman. If you are conducting a Block (because the higher scheme is depending on it) and have some good terrain then perhaps its the best bet. A mobile defence against an enemy with superior mobility might be a disaster! A mobile defence can also turn into a meeting engagement.

 

[Infanteer]

Yet our BG in Ops states that the reserves conduct countermoves, and actually refers to it as a "stage" of the MDB, implying that it is the latter part of the battle... in my opinion, this is just plain wrong. If you've got a good countermoves plan, they are likely performing a block task, perhaps multiple times, before the static position is even in direct contact.

As T2B alluded to, you are confusing the covering force fight with the countermoves fight.  A covering force - as a security element - won't seek decision, nor will it force the enemy to culminate (Theoretically, it could, if you had an enemy tripping over its own feet).  Go to 7-109 - 7-110 of Land Ops for the definition of screen, guard, cover as different degrees of a security element.

 

[ballz]

As T2B alluded to, you are confusing the covering force fight with the countermoves fight.

With all due respect, I'm not. I know the difference between the covering force battle and the countermoves doing their thing within the main defensive stage.

Let me be more clear... BG in Ops states there are 2 stages of the defence... (Page 7- 6)
1) Covering force stage
2) Main defensive stage including the countermoves

Within "Conduct of the main defensive stage," (Page 7-13) it refers to the "countermoves stage," (7-15) and it discusses in a manner that implies that it's the last stage as opposed to occurring congruent to the fight occurring in the static, occupied BPs. It also explicitly states that the primary task of reserves is to CATK along with a whole host of other things I don't agree with (or don't understand at least), but I digress.

The countermoves are part of the main defensive battle - they could occur near the start of the MDB (unlikely but possible), the middle or at the conclusion.

I disagree that it is unlikely you would use countermoves near the start of the MDB. After the covering force crosses the battle handover line, the enemy is still going to be trying to find the path of least resistance, the weak spot, to exploit. If you aren't employing countermoves to preemptively reinforce against or block the enemy based on your sense assets, you're going to be too late. I feel like the countermoves have to be occurring, or at least prepared to occur based on what choices the enemy makes, from beginning to end, completely congruent (and not subsequent) to the fight in the occupied BPs. Hence why it's better described as a supporting plan than as a stage.

BG in Ops is not prescriptive on that. You don't tend to conduct your decisive counterattack until the enemy is culminated, though, so its natural to see most countermoves actions towards the end of the MDB.

When I read it, it seems pretty prescriptive, albeit it is referring to the formation countermove plan. It describes having depth elements providing blocks/reinforces, committing the entire reserve at once to conduct a big final CATK, etc. I just don't see it as correct to describe the countermoves as a stage like the publication does. We wouldn't describe any of the other supporting plans as a stage, would we? Because they are all happening simultaneously.

I also question if CATKs 1. have to be decisive. and 2. have to be "sweeping through and resuming the offense." If I identify 6 likely FB positions, and 6 likely attack positions, that's 12x CATK tasks I'm going to put on my countermoves matrix. I may repel numerous attempts at attacks simply by deploying a small force to CATK by fire when and where the EN is particularly vulnerable and where it will disrupt him the most. This is an offensive mindset, using offensive action in the defensive. In this case, the number of countermoves occurring before a big decisive counterattack far outnumbers the amount of countermoves occuring towards the end.

 

[Infanteer]

I'll offer the following carrots to munch on:

1.  If you need to "preemptively employ countermoves, after the covering force crosses the battle handover line, to reinforce against or block the enemy and prevent him from finding the path of least resistance," (to paraphrase your first statement) then you've probably set your battle handover line in the wrong place.  If I was planning a defensive fight, I would not want a "break" in contact between the covering force and the main defensive force during the defensive battle.

2.  If you have "12 different counterattack tasks on your countermoves matrix," (to paraphrase your next statement) then you're probably mishandling your reserve.  The last thing you want to do is fritter it away piece meal reacting to every enemy action considered a threat.  "Firebase positions and attack positions" are things you deal with through your direct and indirect fire plans, not by committing your reserve.

3.  The way you frame your argument seems to argue that an area defence (as portrayed in Land Ops) is too reactive in blocking/reinforcing and waiting for the big counterattack at the end.  If I read it right, you are arguing for "using offensive action in the defence" and that constant counter-movement (for lack of a better term) would be implicit in an "offensive defence."  Are you just indicating a preference for mobile defence over area defence?  While preference is fine, means and circumstances may not give you the choice.  However, the scenario you appear to describe is common, especially in theatres with a low density of forces - just look up some German defensive battles on the Eastern Front.  However, in these cases both tactical and operational reserves are still maintained as the defender conducts his mobile defence.

4.  The primary reason I would argue that you wish to avoid committing your reserve early (in either a mobile or an area defence) is that you tip your hand.  This goes back to Old Dead Carl and the very reason we find ourselves on the defence in the first place.  We are on the defence because something is preventing us from going to the offence.  That something is probably a correlation of forces, or we'd probably just take to the offence ourselves.  The defensive concept is parrying a blow, the characteristic, awaiting the blow, the object, preservation.  I need the enemy to wear himself down, commit his reserve, limit his freedom of action, and in doing so culminate so I can then act to take the initiative.  This is when I introduce my reserve, for if I introduce it earlier, I'm probably doing what the enemy is looking for - he'll then commit his reserve to run my committed forces over and achieve breakthrough/breakout.  In all higher level exercises I've been exposed to, we try to get the defending enemy to commit his reserves so we can destroy them and take advantage of the loss of freedom of action he now faces.  If he commits them early, so much the better.

In the end, I'll again offer my opinion that the Canadian doctrine is a bit simplistic due to our institutional unfamiliarity with sustained defensive operations and the relatively low level that it concerns itself with.  It's not in our heritage or collective memory.  If you want a good synopsis of the state of the art with all the nuances of different defensive approaches, here's a good read.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Wasn't the Cold War plans, all about defense and being able to defend, retreat, defend and slowly reduce and absorb the Soviet assault?

 

[Red_Five]

BG in Ops and Land Ops both have the defence in two stages: covering force and main defensive including countermoves. It also goes to say that the transition from one stage to another is seldom distinct. Countermoves are part of the main defensive stage. They are also a supporting plan. BG in Ops elaborates how the BG might participate in the formation countermoves stage, either as the formation countermoves force or supporting the formation countermoves. The BG will have its own countermoves as part of its main defensive stage. The formation will have its own countermoves, which would usually happen after any BG level actions. The Brigade commander, for instance, would most likely hold his own countermoves force (perhaps an Armoured Battle Group) until he deems the enemy that he is concerned with is culminated. 

A BG countermoves plan may focus on reinforcement and blocking. It might focus on counterattacking. It might have the possibility of all three. The timing will always be variable. Reinforcing may happen early in the main defensive stage, or it may not. The CO will read the battle and decide accordingly. There is, of course, tension between going too early and going too late. That is why we have wargames and Decision Support Templates. I suppose I might err on the side of early with reinforcement, but you could be playing into the enemy's hands by jumping at the first attack and throwing everything in.

Regarding counterattacks, BG in Ops offers some advice regarding the timing of such attacks. Going too early, as Infanteer noted, can mean a meeting engagement or worse. You might "bite" on the enemy feint and be completely off-balance. Go in too late and you hit the enemy when he is already consolidated and ready for you. Its probably the most important decision that the BG CO (or Bde Comd with his countermoves/reserve) will make. You do want the enemy "off-balance" and fully engaged with something other than the counterattack. This might mean that the original infantry positions and any countermoves blocking forces are themselves decisively engaged.

 

[MedCorps]

1.  If you need to "preemptively employ countermoves, after the covering force crosses the battle handover line, to reinforce against or block the enemy and prevent him from finding the path of least resistance," (to paraphrase your first statement) then you've probably set your battle handover line in the wrong place.  If I was planning a defensive fight, I would not want a "break" in contact between the covering force and the main defensive force during the defensive battle.

I have seen this occur a number of times now on large CAXs / TEWTs including once with the USMC. Either the battle handover line was in the wrong place, there was confusion over where the battle handover line was or the commander launched the countermove too fast. All three situations result in a goat rodeo. 

Although we seldom practice how to gracefully recover from a tactical fumble, this would be one scenario that I would talk though with your team. What happens if the countermoves force is committed too early? How will I know they were committed too early? How will I recover? What are the options to prevent the rodeo?

Good discussion.  Enjoy following.

MC