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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

Kirkhill

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Looks like a role for an Army Multi-Domain Task Force (plus)

🍻

Great point FJAG.

Liz Truss is the Brit responsible for organizing British trade deals post-Brexit. She has a presentation to make to the WTO after the recent releases of the Global Britain reviews.

On Tuesday night Whitehall sources said Ms Truss was concerned that the WTO has been “too soft on China for too long” and thinks it’s ludicrous that China is still classed as a “developing nation” by the WTO.

“Pernicious practices by non-market economies like China have given trade a bad name, from forced labour and forced technology transfer to mass unreported subsidies and environmental degradation.”

China has repeatedly faced criticism over its industrial policy and the flooding of global markets with cheap Chinese goods such as steel; alleged mass intellectual property theft; and reported human rights abuses, including against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang.

There has been some concern expressed that Britain has been too soft on China itself - much like Canada - pursuing cheap goods and a big market.

But the issue is that:

a) China is too big to fight
b) China is too big to ignore

But it also seems to me that China (and Russia for that matter) doesn't really want to fight. They want to "win". By other means.

And it is those other means, in multiple domains, that need to be addressed.

Truss is addressing, in my opinion, the principal domain - the economic one. Everything else follows from that.

But it is only one domain. And all the other domains need to be managed so we don't have another accident like Sarajevo 1914 or Pearl Harbor 1941.

Managing Multi-Domain Competition so that it doesn't accidentally become Multi-Domain Conflict.

Age old question:

When to offer the carrot? When to use the stick?

What is tolerable?

 

MilEME09

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China continues its show down with the Philippines over Chinese flagged fishing fleet illegally in Philippines EEZ.
 

Colin Parkinson

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China has already shown that it's willing to do such things, here in Canada and aboard, and to be fair the US and the USSR were doing the same in the Cold War. So why people think China would not do such is a bit beyond me.
 

Kirkhill

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The fishing vessels arrived one and two at a time, dropping anchor off the disputed Whitsun Reef near the Philippines. As the Chinese-flagged fleet grew larger, the vessels tethered themselves together, hunkering down for a gray zone standoff that has captured policymaker interest throughout the Pacific region.

And with that, Beijing burst Washington’s deterrence bubble.

To be successful, the Defense Department must rethink its entire approach to gray zone warfare and embrace the notion that combat is no longer binary, particularly when confronting China’s maritime pursuits. The department must also jettison outdated, phased and overly rigid operational planning for a more flexible strategic framework that better addresses the reality of asymmetric competition. Just as Beijing need not launch an assault on Taipei to exert control over the island, neither must we wait until military hostilities have commenced to engage U.S. forces.


Constabulary Warfare?

Armies protect the Constabulary which protects the Crown which protects the People.

Conventional warfare pits an army against an army trying to depose the Crown and impose a foreign Constabulary on the People.

But what happens when the People, or at least a significant segment of the People, perhaps with foreign infiltration, appear to oppose the Constabulary. Does the Crown resort to using the Army against the People? Or does it militarize the Constabulary to better deal with seditious elements? Or, as in this case, foreign agents intentionally act illegally within the Crown's domain? Does it immediately send gunboats up the Yangtze? Or cruise missiles into Baghdad?

AOPVs and OPVs acting for the Coast Guard and the RCMP/Carabinieri/Gendarmerie/Garda against economic incursions forces the other guy to take the first swing with their Army.

How do you force the other side to break cover first and give you a casus belli for a just war?
 

CBH99

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Constabulary Warfare?

Armies protect the Constabulary which protects the Crown which protects the People.

Conventional warfare pits an army against an army trying to depose the Crown and impose a foreign Constabulary on the People.

But what happens when the People, or at least a significant segment of the People, perhaps with foreign infiltration, appear to oppose the Constabulary. Does the Crown resort to using the Army against the People? Or does it militarize the Constabulary to better deal with seditious elements? Or, as in this case, foreign agents intentionally act illegally within the Crown's domain? Does it immediately send gunboats up the Yangtze? Or cruise missiles into Baghdad?

AOPVs and OPVs acting for the Coast Guard and the RCMP/Carabinieri/Gendarmerie/Garda against economic incursions forces the other guy to take the first swing with their Army.

How do you force the other side to break cover first and give you a casus belli for a just war?
What's truly frightening is the combination of hard, soft, and what I'll dub 'intellectual' assets the Chinese seem to have in their gameplan.

Obviously, their military capabilities have been discussed at much length. They can concentrate more assets in the SCS than the west possibly could, and those assets are supported with supporting fires of mind-blowing numbers.

Their devious, yet effective, soft power is just as much of a danger. Whether it be their coast guard, or the 'fleet of trawlers' which just show up when the Chinese want something, protected by their well armed coast guard.


But the fact that the Chinese leadership is spry enough & forward thinking enough to build dedicated soft power assets such as the fishing fleet, coast guard, etc etc - built to give them a specific capability - and that they use international law in such a back-sided way that helps to further enable them towards their goals.

One thing is for certain...the Chinese have a very solid idea of what they want to accomplish, and what they need in order to do it. They don't have the politics of western countries getting in the way. :confused:
 

MarkOttawa

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And Taiwan sticks it to Justin:

Taiwan says it would be an ‘affirmation and honour’ if President Tsai were to receive Halifax summit award​


Taiwan says it would be honoured to receive an award from the Halifax International Security Forum, an annual event funded by the Canadian government.

Canada, however, has reportedly warned forum organizers that it will yank funding if the prize is given to Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, in a move that Politico.com attributed to fear of offending Chinese Communist Party.

Beijing considers the self-governing democracy of Taiwan a breakaway province despite the fact the Chinese Communist Party, which took power in 1949, has never ruled the island. China has been trying to isolate Taiwan from the international community over the past 50 years. Ms. Tsai was re-elected as its President by a landslide last year on a promise of defending the island’s democracy and standing up to China.

According to Politico.com, organizers of the Halifax International Security Forum decided to give its John McCain Prize for Leadership in Public Service to Ms. Tsai. The media outlet said when Canadian officials learned of the forum’s plans, they made it clear the Canadian government would pull support and funding if the prize was given to Taiwan’s President.

According to federal supplementary estimate documents from 2019-20, the Department of National Defence’s annual contribution to the forum is about $3-million.

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan, asked about the John McCain prize, said the Halifax forum is not run from Ottawa. “This organization is an independent organization, and they make their own decisions regarding these matters.”

Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs told The Globe and Mail it would be “an affirmation and an honour” should the prize be awarded to Ms. Tsai.

It said it was not confirming media reports that the forum “is unable to award President Tsai Ing-wen the John McCain Prize for Leadership in the Public Service owing to pressure from the Canadian government,” but only taking note of what has been published.

Joanne Ou, spokeswoman for Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), noted the self-governing island has long had relations with the Halifax forum.

“Having long maintained close contact with HFX, Taiwan MOFA believes that if [the forum] were indeed to confer this prize upon President Tsai, it would be an affirmation and honour for both President Tsai and the people of Taiwan in their anti-pandemic efforts and democratic achievements,” Ms. Ou said in a statement.

However, she said, Taiwan will not attempt to interfere or sway the forum in making a decision on the matter...

Tee hee.

Mark
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daftandbarmy

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What's truly frightening is the combination of hard, soft, and what I'll dub 'intellectual' assets the Chinese seem to have in their gameplan.

Obviously, their military capabilities have been discussed at much length. They can concentrate more assets in the SCS than the west possibly could, and those assets are supported with supporting fires of mind-blowing numbers.

Their devious, yet effective, soft power is just as much of a danger. Whether it be their coast guard, or the 'fleet of trawlers' which just show up when the Chinese want something, protected by their well armed coast guard.


But the fact that the Chinese leadership is spry enough & forward thinking enough to build dedicated soft power assets such as the fishing fleet, coast guard, etc etc - built to give them a specific capability - and that they use international law in such a back-sided way that helps to further enable them towards their goals.

One thing is for certain...the Chinese have a very solid idea of what they want to accomplish, and what they need in order to do it. They don't have the politics of western countries getting in the way. :confused:

For those nations who have not done so already, there's a great argument for realigning ourselves to counter Russian and Chinese expansionism:


Countering Russian and Chinese Influence Activities Examining Democratic Vulnerabilities and Building Resiliency

Since 2014 and the events leading up to the annexation of Crimea, awareness and understanding of Russian malign influence activities across Europe and the United States have grown. More recently, Chinese influence activities in countries throughout the IndoPacific region have become the subject of growing scrutiny and concern. Whereas Russian influence efforts have aimed to disrupt and delegitimize democratic institutions, China has sought to permeate and influence democratic societies in order to coopt and constrain public debate on China and silence critics of the Chinese communist regime.

The influence activities of these authoritarian regimes pose a common threat to democracies but in different ways and with varying degrees of success. The Covid-19 pandemic has shed new light on Russian and Chinese influence activities and created new opportunities for Moscow and Beijing to advance geopolitical goals through a range of influence operations, including through disinformation efforts. Despite greater awareness of the challenge to democracies posed by these authoritarian systems, governments need to develop better and more effective countermeasures.

There is a growing body of research which describes the strategies and tactics of influence activities—the supply of influence—coming from Moscow and Beijing. This research illuminates tactics and strategies as well but focuses on achieving a better understanding of how and why influence activities are consumed within democratic societies—the demand side of the equation. How does disinformation enter and shape the information ecosystem within democratic societies? In what ways do domestic actors benefit from the supply of foreign influence activities? Which efforts have been successful in influencing societies and political outcomes and why? Which activities have failed and why? It is with this in mind that CSIS set out to analyze Russian influence activities in the United Kingdom and Germany and Chinese influence activities in Japan and Australia.

We sought to better understand how these influence efforts play out in these four democracies and how these governments and societies have (or have not) responded. We examined which factors make countries particularly vulnerable to Chinese or Russian malign influence operations and identified the sources of resilience that enable democratic governments and polities to mitigate, fend off, or push back on malign efforts. We also sought to determine the degree to which China and Russia have been successful in influencing outcomes through their activities. Finally, we assess how the strategies and tactics used by Russia and China differ or converge.

 

RangerRay

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Somehow I have my doubts that this government will take this report seriously. They seem to be awfully deferential to Beijing.
 

Kirkhill

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A couple of interesting counters -

A curious, and momentary, gaffe on the part of the head of the Chinese CDC - declaring that their vaccines were not sufficiently effective. Even though the Chinese are charging 10 times as much as the AstraZeneca vaccine. China is looking at loss of influence, a diminished economy and a continued lock down - along with restive populations in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xianjing and Tibet. What happens if they lose the cities as well?



Palau

During World War I, the Japanese Empire annexed the islands after seizing them from Germany in 1914. Following World War I, the League of Nations formally placed the islands under Japanese administration as part of the South Seas Mandate. In World War II, Palau was used by Japan to support its 1941 invasion of the Philippines, which succeeded in 1942. The invasion overthrew the American-installed Commonwealth government in the Philippines and installed the Japanese-backed Second Philippine Republic in 1943.[19]

During World War II, the United States captured Palau from Japan in 1944 after the costly Battle of Peleliu, when more than 2,000 Americans and 10,000 Japanese were killed.



China has been pressuring Palau economically (see Phillipines, Brunei, Australia....)

Meanwhile Palau happy to be seen associated with Anti-CCP nations. Sailors get a run ashore. Palau makes a dollar. China sees Palau supported by foreign flags.
 

Kirkhill

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And just a reminder of the rules of the game per Saul Alinsky and Wikipedia

The Rules​

  1. "Power is not only what you have but what the enemy thinks you have."
  2. "Never go outside the expertise of your people."
  3. "Whenever possible go outside the expertise of the enemy."
  4. "Make the enemy live up to its own book of rules."
  5. "Ridicule is man's most potent weapon. There is no defense. It is almost impossible to counterattack ridicule. Also it infuriates the opposition, who then react to your advantage."
  6. "A good tactic is one your people enjoy."
  7. "A tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag."
  8. "Keep the pressure on."
  9. "The threat is usually more terrifying than the thing itself. "
  10. "The major premise for tactics is the development of operations that will maintain a constant pressure upon the opposition."
  11. "If you push a negative hard and deep enough it will break through into its counterside; this is based on the principle that every positive has its negative."
  12. "The price of a successful attack is a constructive alternative."
  13. "Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it. "

Key rules (IMO) 1,4,6,9,13.
 

YZT580

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For those nations who have not done so already, there's a great argument for realigning ourselves to counter Russian and Chinese expansionism:


Countering Russian and Chinese Influence Activities Examining Democratic Vulnerabilities and Building Resiliency



The solution is simple but potentially painful in the short term: stop buying. Do what Trump did to a certain extent and slap punitive surcharges on every product stamped Made in China. The west's only viable weapon is money. We don't have either the resources or the will to use the threat of force to stop their advance in the China Sea. None of the countries there can hope to stand up to a concerted attack as demonstrated by the fishing fleets and the Chinese efforts in the Spratleys. But squeeze their income and maybe we can accomplish something. Let China and Russia trade between themselves.
 

daftandbarmy

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The solution is simple but potentially painful in the short term: stop buying. Do what Trump did to a certain extent and slap punitive surcharges on every product stamped Made in China. The west's only viable weapon is money. We don't have either the resources or the will to use the threat of force to stop their advance in the China Sea. None of the countries there can hope to stand up to a concerted attack as demonstrated by the fishing fleets and the Chinese efforts in the Spratleys. But squeeze their income and maybe we can accomplish something. Let China and Russia trade between themselves.

Well, I know people who had to move their orders out of China due to the Trump ban, so the Chinese moved their factories to Vietnam etc. They've been up and running quite nicely for a couple of years now, thanks very much.

There's a mental posture that we just don't have, in the West, that requires a solid and honest rethink about how we deal with non-Western Euro/NA countries who don't like us very much :)
 

MilEME09

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China keeping up the pressure on Taiwan, a 25 aircraft force harassing Taiwan ADIZ, I'm sure that put up the pucker factor for Taiwan.
 

MarkOttawa

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1) Now CSIS annual report:

Canada: Most espionage since Cold War amid pandemic​

The Canadian Security Intelligence has released its 2020 public report. The spy agency says that the frictions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have led to a rise in foreign spying and interference.

Espionage and foreign interference in or against Canada in 2020 was tracked "at levels not seen since the Cold War," a report published by Canada's spy agency said on Monday [April 12]...


The report underpinned cloak-and-dagger activities carried out by China and Russia.

The CSIS said that the two countries, along with other foreign states, continued to "covertly collect political, economic, and military information in Canada through targeted threat activities" in support of their own development ambitions.

"An example of significant concern are activities by threat actors affiliated with the People's Republic of China that seek to leverage and exploit critical freedoms that are otherwise protected by Canadian society and the government in order to further the political interests of the Communist Party of China [emphasis added]," the report said.

The observations in the report come nearly two months after Vigneault in February identified China as posing a serious strategic threat to Canada, while the CSIS also for the first identified state-sponsored programs in Russia, North Korea, Iran and China as cyber crime threats late last year.

2) And from Chair of National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (a Liberal) following Committee's annual report--he wants more done to combat, in particular, PRC's foreign influence/interference activities in Canadian politics (India also likely active along these lines at lesser level):

State actors are looking to join political parties to 'exert influence,' chair of security committee warns​

Liberal MP David McGuinty says Canada's interference warning system should expand its mandate​


Foreign governments are looking to meddle in Canada's democratic institutions and the government's foreign interference warning system should alert Canadians to state actors' "traditional" election tricks, says the chair of one of Canada's national security committees.

Liberal MP David McGuinty, who has headed the secretive National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians since its inception, said the internal panel set up in 2019 to sound the alarm on election interference — the "critical election incident public protocol panel" — should have its mandate expanded to include old-school espionage techniques.

"What does that mean? That means volunteers signing up to work in campaign offices or campaign settings. It means individuals joining political parties and attending nomination meetings in order to attempt to exert influence. Usually, the motivation is directed in some way by a foreign government
[emphasis added]," McGuinty told CBC News soon after NSICOP's 2020 report was tabled in the House of Commons on Monday [April 12, text https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2021-04-12-ar/annual_report_2020_public_en.pdf ].

"We've seen this, we've reported on it in 2019. We've seen more of this in this annual report. So we believe that traditional forms of interference ought to be included in the mandate of that five person political panel."

NSICOP, which is made up of MPs and Senators who are sworn to secrecy, has called out China and Russia in the past for using members of their diaspora populations to conduct foreign influence operations on their behalf.

"Foreign states use direct and indirect contact to influence democratic and electoral institutions and processes by manipulating ethnocultural communities, persons in positions of authority or influence, and the media [emphasis added]," says the redacted 2020 report.

McGuinty said the committee has written a list of recommendations to the prime minister to shore up Canada's election interference warning system before the next campaign, whenever it comes.

Warning system panel should be expanded: NSICOP​


The election panel was established in 2019 to alert the public to acts of election interference during the campaign period. The panel is made up of the clerk of the Privy Council, the federal national security and intelligence adviser, the deputy minister of justice, the deputy minister of public safety and the deputy minister of Global Affairs Canada (GAC).

If the panel finds evidence of a substantial threat to a free and fair election, it's supposed to tell the prime minister, political party officials and Elections Canada and then make a public announcement. The Privy Council Office said the panel did observe suspicious activities during the 2019 election but they never reached a level of seriousness that would have required the panel to go public.

NSICOP members said the government should consider adding other respected Canadians to the panel, such as retired jurists.

"The committee is concerned that senior public servants appointed to the panel may be preoccupied with transition preparations during the writ period, and notes that an intervention by a non-partisan and high-profile group that includes prominent Canadians may carry more weight in the highly politicized context of an election [emphasis added]," said the report...

The committee's annual report encouraged Ottawa to take all of its recommendations seriously. Since the tabling of its first report in December 2018, the committee has made 23 recommendations to the government.

"The government's response to the Committee's reports has been limited," notes the report.

"The committee recognizes that the government is not required to respond to its recommendations; however, the Committee believes that regular and substantive responses would contribute to strengthening the accountability and increasing the transparency of the security and intelligence community
[emphasis added]."

NSICOP was set up to to give certain parliamentarians access to top-secret materials and to allow them to question leaders in the security and intelligence community. It meets in secret and reports directly to the prime minister on national security matters.

Mark
Ottawa
 
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