http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FD10Ad02.html
TAIPEI - If China ever makes the decision to invade Taiwan it is unlikely to be a large-scale Normandy-style amphibious assault. The reality is that China is more likely to use a decapitation strategy. Decapitation strategies short circuit command and control systems, wipe out nationwide nerve centers, and leave the opponent hopelessly lost. As the old saying goes, "Kill the head and the body dies." All China needs to do is seize the center of power, the capital and its leaders.
If China decides to use force to reunify the mainland with what it terms a breakaway province, the window of opportunity is believed to be 2006. This would give China a couple of years to clean up the mess before the 2008 Summer Olympics. Most analysts estimate that China‘s military strength will surpass Taiwan‘s defense capabilities by 2005. So 2006 - the Year of the Dog - is clearly the year to fear.
United States Defense Department officials now are reexamining China‘s military threat to Taiwan. This rethink has caused a dramatic shift in the way many think of defending Taiwan. Traditionally, Taiwan had always feared an amphibious assault - the Normandy scenario - and its defense strategy was always designed to stop such an attack. Now with a potential decapitation strategy believed to be in the works, US defense officials are beginning to think what had once been unthinkable: losing Taiwan in only seven days.
The Taiwan takeover scenario
China‘s deployment of its special forces and rapid-deployment forces, combined with air power and missile strikes, is the most likely formula for successfully taking Taiwan with the least amount of effort and damage. The military acronym KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid!) is in full force here. Special forces, which blend strength with deception and flair, offer China laser cutters rather than sledge hammers for defeating Taiwan‘s armed forces.
An airborne assault directly on Taipei by China‘s 15th Airborne Corps (Changchun), with three divisions (43rd, 44th, 45th) would be the first phase of the assault, with additional paratroopers being dropped in Linkou, Taoyuan and Ilian, to tie up Taiwan‘s four divisions assigned to the 6th Army (North). A Chinese airborne division contains 11,000 men with light tanks and self-propelled artillery. Some intelligence reports have indicated that China was able to airlift one airborne division to Tibet in less than 48 hours in 1988. Today, China‘s ability to transport troops has greatly improved. China is expected to be able to deliver twice that number - 22,000 - in two days.
Taiwan‘s 6th Army has seven infantry brigades: 106, 116, 118, 152, 153, 176, and 178. The 152/153 Dragons and the the 176/178 Tigers are said to be the best. Also a direct assault on the 6th Army‘s 269th motorized brigade, 351st armored infantry brigade, and the 542nd armored brigade would be mandatory for Chinese forces.
Most of the initial fighting would be in the Zhong Zheng District, Taipei, which contains the Presidential Building, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Legislative Yuan. As soon as China‘s troops hit the ground they would have to deal with Taiwan‘s Military Police Command (MPC). The MPC is responsible for protecting key government buildings and military installations. Its personnel are the gatekeepers, holding all the keys and guarding all the doors. They are considered no-nonsense and are humorless when approached. China‘s airborne forces would meet immediate resistance from these Taipei forces. Regular army units, all based outside of Taipei, would take hours, perhaps days, to respond. It would be up to the MPC to hold the Chinese back until reinforcements arrived - which might be never.
Assassins, saboteurs would be prepositioned
Pre-positioned special forces, smuggled into Taiwan months before, would assassinate key leaders, and attack radar and communication facilities around Taiwan a few hours before the main attack. Infiltrators might receive some assistance from sympathetic elements within Taiwan‘s military and police, who are believed to be at least 75 percent pro-Kuomintang (KMT), and hence, pro-unification. Many could use taxis to move about the city unnoticed. Mainland Chinese prostitutes, already in abundance in Taiwan, could be recruited by Chinese intelligence to serve as femme fatales, supplying critical intelligence on the locations of key government and military leaders at odd hours of the night; death is the ultimate aphrodisiac.
<snip>
Why is Taiwan worth fighting for?
To anyone who looks at a map of the region, the reasons are obvious. Taiwan‘s strategic location makes it extremely valuable. The Taiwan Strait is a critical sea lane, and taking Taiwan would allow China to choke off international commercial shipping, especially oil, to Japan and South Korea, should it ever decide to do so. In addition, Taiwan serves as a vital window for US intelligence collection. Taiwan‘s National Security Bureau and the US National Security Agency jointly run a Signal Intelligence facility on Yangmingshan Mountain just north of Taipei (see Spook Mountain: How US spies on China, March 6, 2021). Taiwan‘s inclusion into China‘s military power structure would be unthinkable for Japan.
Of course, this is only a scenario based on selected facts and seasoned with conjecture. Speculation about what China could do and what it will do are rarely comparable. Too many media pundits make mention of a Normandy-style invasion, or an apocalyptic-style missile strike, without seriously considering the fastest way between two points. Of course, China, be warned: "No plan survives the first seconds of combat."
Wendell Minnick is the Jane‘s Defence Weekly correspondent for Taiwan and the author of Spies and Provocateurs: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Persons Conducting Espionage and Covert Action (McFarland 1992). He can be contacted at [email protected].
___________________________________________________
When looking at the latest poll figures http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/682137.stm it doesn‘t seem like the pro-independence Taiwanese have a clear majority. Despite the obvious differences in their creation, I can‘t help but want to draw comparisons between Taiwan and Quebec; were the Parti Quebecois to win the next provincial election, and decide to pursue unillateral independence (with the support of a larger number of like-minded voters than Taiwan‘s DPP) would Canada be justified in taking military action to force reunification? (Pretend the government would play along!)
The author in the article above seemed to abstain from mentioning China‘s nuclear arsenal in any showdown with the US. If China managed to amass a significant nuclear arsenal, and waited until such time that the Taiwanese government began pushing for independence (against the wishes of the US government) couldn‘t it force the US to back off? I mean, even if the US were able to field an effective missile defence system that would actually work when under attack from another superpower, and not some rogue state, in under 2 years, would that really help it keep up with evolving missile tech? (hypersonic cruise missiles...?)
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20040329.wruss0329/BNStory/International/
Is Taiwan really worth the risk of a large scale world war, especially when such a large segment of the population wants reunification?
EDIT: As a sidenote, don‘t the Chinese Special Forces have the coolest insignia ever?
TAIPEI - If China ever makes the decision to invade Taiwan it is unlikely to be a large-scale Normandy-style amphibious assault. The reality is that China is more likely to use a decapitation strategy. Decapitation strategies short circuit command and control systems, wipe out nationwide nerve centers, and leave the opponent hopelessly lost. As the old saying goes, "Kill the head and the body dies." All China needs to do is seize the center of power, the capital and its leaders.
If China decides to use force to reunify the mainland with what it terms a breakaway province, the window of opportunity is believed to be 2006. This would give China a couple of years to clean up the mess before the 2008 Summer Olympics. Most analysts estimate that China‘s military strength will surpass Taiwan‘s defense capabilities by 2005. So 2006 - the Year of the Dog - is clearly the year to fear.
United States Defense Department officials now are reexamining China‘s military threat to Taiwan. This rethink has caused a dramatic shift in the way many think of defending Taiwan. Traditionally, Taiwan had always feared an amphibious assault - the Normandy scenario - and its defense strategy was always designed to stop such an attack. Now with a potential decapitation strategy believed to be in the works, US defense officials are beginning to think what had once been unthinkable: losing Taiwan in only seven days.
The Taiwan takeover scenario
China‘s deployment of its special forces and rapid-deployment forces, combined with air power and missile strikes, is the most likely formula for successfully taking Taiwan with the least amount of effort and damage. The military acronym KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid!) is in full force here. Special forces, which blend strength with deception and flair, offer China laser cutters rather than sledge hammers for defeating Taiwan‘s armed forces.
An airborne assault directly on Taipei by China‘s 15th Airborne Corps (Changchun), with three divisions (43rd, 44th, 45th) would be the first phase of the assault, with additional paratroopers being dropped in Linkou, Taoyuan and Ilian, to tie up Taiwan‘s four divisions assigned to the 6th Army (North). A Chinese airborne division contains 11,000 men with light tanks and self-propelled artillery. Some intelligence reports have indicated that China was able to airlift one airborne division to Tibet in less than 48 hours in 1988. Today, China‘s ability to transport troops has greatly improved. China is expected to be able to deliver twice that number - 22,000 - in two days.
Taiwan‘s 6th Army has seven infantry brigades: 106, 116, 118, 152, 153, 176, and 178. The 152/153 Dragons and the the 176/178 Tigers are said to be the best. Also a direct assault on the 6th Army‘s 269th motorized brigade, 351st armored infantry brigade, and the 542nd armored brigade would be mandatory for Chinese forces.
Most of the initial fighting would be in the Zhong Zheng District, Taipei, which contains the Presidential Building, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Legislative Yuan. As soon as China‘s troops hit the ground they would have to deal with Taiwan‘s Military Police Command (MPC). The MPC is responsible for protecting key government buildings and military installations. Its personnel are the gatekeepers, holding all the keys and guarding all the doors. They are considered no-nonsense and are humorless when approached. China‘s airborne forces would meet immediate resistance from these Taipei forces. Regular army units, all based outside of Taipei, would take hours, perhaps days, to respond. It would be up to the MPC to hold the Chinese back until reinforcements arrived - which might be never.
Assassins, saboteurs would be prepositioned
Pre-positioned special forces, smuggled into Taiwan months before, would assassinate key leaders, and attack radar and communication facilities around Taiwan a few hours before the main attack. Infiltrators might receive some assistance from sympathetic elements within Taiwan‘s military and police, who are believed to be at least 75 percent pro-Kuomintang (KMT), and hence, pro-unification. Many could use taxis to move about the city unnoticed. Mainland Chinese prostitutes, already in abundance in Taiwan, could be recruited by Chinese intelligence to serve as femme fatales, supplying critical intelligence on the locations of key government and military leaders at odd hours of the night; death is the ultimate aphrodisiac.
<snip>
Why is Taiwan worth fighting for?
To anyone who looks at a map of the region, the reasons are obvious. Taiwan‘s strategic location makes it extremely valuable. The Taiwan Strait is a critical sea lane, and taking Taiwan would allow China to choke off international commercial shipping, especially oil, to Japan and South Korea, should it ever decide to do so. In addition, Taiwan serves as a vital window for US intelligence collection. Taiwan‘s National Security Bureau and the US National Security Agency jointly run a Signal Intelligence facility on Yangmingshan Mountain just north of Taipei (see Spook Mountain: How US spies on China, March 6, 2021). Taiwan‘s inclusion into China‘s military power structure would be unthinkable for Japan.
Of course, this is only a scenario based on selected facts and seasoned with conjecture. Speculation about what China could do and what it will do are rarely comparable. Too many media pundits make mention of a Normandy-style invasion, or an apocalyptic-style missile strike, without seriously considering the fastest way between two points. Of course, China, be warned: "No plan survives the first seconds of combat."
Wendell Minnick is the Jane‘s Defence Weekly correspondent for Taiwan and the author of Spies and Provocateurs: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Persons Conducting Espionage and Covert Action (McFarland 1992). He can be contacted at [email protected].
___________________________________________________
When looking at the latest poll figures http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/682137.stm it doesn‘t seem like the pro-independence Taiwanese have a clear majority. Despite the obvious differences in their creation, I can‘t help but want to draw comparisons between Taiwan and Quebec; were the Parti Quebecois to win the next provincial election, and decide to pursue unillateral independence (with the support of a larger number of like-minded voters than Taiwan‘s DPP) would Canada be justified in taking military action to force reunification? (Pretend the government would play along!)
The author in the article above seemed to abstain from mentioning China‘s nuclear arsenal in any showdown with the US. If China managed to amass a significant nuclear arsenal, and waited until such time that the Taiwanese government began pushing for independence (against the wishes of the US government) couldn‘t it force the US to back off? I mean, even if the US were able to field an effective missile defence system that would actually work when under attack from another superpower, and not some rogue state, in under 2 years, would that really help it keep up with evolving missile tech? (hypersonic cruise missiles...?)
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20040329.wruss0329/BNStory/International/
Is Taiwan really worth the risk of a large scale world war, especially when such a large segment of the population wants reunification?
EDIT: As a sidenote, don‘t the Chinese Special Forces have the coolest insignia ever?