Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen

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While thinking on this, and swapping PMs with Infanteer I think the real question here isn't whether or not we should dismount on or short of the objective but what assumptions we want to build in to our people as part of foundational training.  Anyone can agree on extreme cases for dismounting short of the objective or on/past the objective so it's really about what "instincts" we want to build into our infantry commanders.

Like Infanteer pointed out the hasty attack is used as the base line for assessment in the army.  The seven section battle drills, the platoon and cbt tm hasty attack are all the same.  They rely on an enemy situation of an isolated enemy element (det, section, platoon) that operates in a very predictable way with little freedom of action.  Essentially a training aid.  As part of this the friendly force is generally pretty well positioned and don't need to worry about enemy IDF or air, and our air and IDF are free to operate.  This situation leads us to do things like dismounting on the objective.

Now, if this is the situation you face in real life, then, maybe, dismounting on the objective might work.  The problem is that habitually doing this creates built in assumptions, and little high end force on force training means that even in a situation where dismounting on the objective might not be appropriate there is few repurcussions.... the assault goes through, the enemy dies or runs away, and we can chalk up another win for team blue.

So, understanding our institution, how we assess, and how little high fidelity training we get, what are the best assumptions to build into the force?  I think this is the crux of the argument, and I think this is where we need to build in a bias for a dismount short of the objective.  Specifically, I'd probably suggest a point short of SRAAW range, covered and concealed, probably 300-500m from the objective depending on how the enemy is equipped.  Dismounted infantry should be able to cover this distance in 9-15 mins (and probably faster) which isn't an unreasonable amount of time for suppression.  Like our preference for training for conventional operations, we can always ramp down in intensity and dismount closer to the objective if the enemy is genuinely neutralised or lacking in anti armour firepower.  The default should be to dismount short of the objective outside SRAAW range. 

I'm not as wedded to whether or not the LAVs accompany the infantry or not.  The presence of the 25mm is of course tempting but I see a few tasks, like flank security that they could go do vice coming on to the objective with the infantry.  If the LAVs come along with the infantry then it's another 8-15 vehs that the infantry must protect while also fighting through the objective.  LAV Company Tactics identifies protected mobility as the primary role for the LAV, after that is fire support for dismounted infantry, followed by destroying other light AFVs.  So, getting the infantry there safe is the most important thing, then they can provide fire support, and they don't need to do that side by side the dismounts.
 

daftandbarmy

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Haligonian said:
While thinking on this, and swapping PMs with Infanteer I think the real question here isn't whether or not we should dismount on or short of the objective but what assumptions we want to build in to our people as part of foundational training.  Anyone can agree on extreme cases for dismounting short of the objective or on/past the objective so it's really about what "instincts" we want to build into our infantry commanders.

Like Infanteer pointed out the hasty attack is used as the base line for assessment in the army.  The seven section battle drills, the platoon and cbt tm hasty attack are all the same.  They rely on an enemy situation of an isolated enemy element (det, section, platoon) that operates in a very predictable way with little freedom of action.  Essentially a training aid.  As part of this the friendly force is generally pretty well positioned and don't need to worry about enemy IDF or air, and our air and IDF are free to operate.  This situation leads us to do things like dismounting on the objective.

Now, if this is the situation you face in real life, then, maybe, dismounting on the objective might work.  The problem is that habitually doing this creates built in assumptions, and little high end force on force training means that even in a situation where dismounting on the objective might not be appropriate there is few repurcussions.... the assault goes through, the enemy dies or runs away, and we can chalk up another win for team blue.

So, understanding our institution, how we assess, and how little high fidelity training we get, what are the best assumptions to build into the force?  I think this is the crux of the argument, and I think this is where we need to build in a bias for a dismount short of the objective.  Specifically, I'd probably suggest a point short of SRAAW range, covered and concealed, probably 300-500m from the objective depending on how the enemy is equipped.  Dismounted infantry should be able to cover this distance in 9-15 mins (and probably faster) which isn't an unreasonable amount of time for suppression.  Like our preference for training for conventional operations, we can always ramp down in intensity and dismount closer to the objective if the enemy is genuinely neutralised or lacking in anti armour firepower.  The default should be to dismount short of the objective outside SRAAW range. 

I'm not as wedded to whether or not the LAVs accompany the infantry or not.  The presence of the 25mm is of course tempting but I see a few tasks, like flank security that they could go do vice coming on to the objective with the infantry.  If the LAVs come along with the infantry then it's another 8-15 vehs that the infantry must protect while also fighting through the objective.  LAV Company Tactics identifies protected mobility as the primary role for the LAV, after that is fire support for dismounted infantry, followed by destroying other light AFVs.  So, getting the infantry there safe is the most important thing, then they can provide fire support, and they don't need to do that side by side the dismounts.

Good points.

It's called DOCTRINE...but we usually interpret that as DOGMA unfortunately.... and punish those who think outside the 'policy prison'.
 

Kirkhill

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Colin P said:
....

I am guessing that for our current ops, a good recce followed heavy short bombardment by multiple rocket launchers and 155's to disorient the defenders while the assault is taking place during the bombardment. Perhaps 1-2 batteries reserved to conduct quick pin point bombardments on areas of defending fire without interrupting the main barrage. of course getting hung up on a minefield 1/2 there would not be good.... The other minor problem is you do not have the artillery resources to do such an assault.   

Your prescription sounds an awful lot like what we were told to expect from the Red Army.  And the the remedy was to be the same as the Germans (WW1) - dig deep and stay low until the armour rolled over the top allowing the opportunity to tackle the infantry behind.
 

Colin Parkinson

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I am a product of that era, but I am not sure how else to suppress hidden ATGM teams. It would hard to be able to stay focused on a target with an ATGM with Air bursts happening around you. Don't have to kill the ATGM (which would be nice) but suppressing their ability to engage.
 

Kirkhill

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Manned ATGM positions are not a given, even now.

The NLOS containerised system was cancelled by the US

220px-NLOS-LS_truck.jpg

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM501_Non-Line-of-Sight_Launch_System

But is well on its way to being perfected by the Israelis with their Spike NLOS system

SPIKE-NLOS-SPARC-Trailer.jpg


The remote launch missile system is also well developed for NASAMs with their dispersed Multiple Missile Launchers for Air Defence.

NASAMS-And%C3%B8ya.ashx


And the US is proceeding with their own MML systems

1459529087_1.jpg


15 assorted missiles in a box that could be dropped anywhere in the battlefield.

Take the 25 km range of the Spike NLOS and add that to a 20 km range precision guided mortar launched from a vehicle mounted automated turret an I suggest that the rules of the game might be changing a bit faster that 25 years.

If the FOO accompanying your company can call up missiles from unmanned caches and precision stonks from mortars without exposing themselves, or your position, then it makes it harder for the enemy to find anything to neutralize or attack.
 

Colin Parkinson

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The majority of the systems used in the latest conflicts are basically 25 year old+ systems that have been evolutionary upgraded. Canada is just re-introducing those systems, we behind even Hezbollah in that regard. It's highly unlikely that even if the unmanned ATGM's go into production, they will be exported. So only a threat for peer to peer and then they would be in short supply. A near peer fight is likely against experienced crews firing wire guided ATGM. 
 

reveng

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I think you'd be surprised what a few good engineers can do with some $$$ and operator input.

However, the point I'm trying to drive home is that we need to be more careful in the assumptions we make.
 
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