While thinking on this, and swapping PMs with Infanteer I think the real question here isn't whether or not we should dismount on or short of the objective but what assumptions we want to build in to our people as part of foundational training. Anyone can agree on extreme cases for dismounting short of the objective or on/past the objective so it's really about what "instincts" we want to build into our infantry commanders.
Like Infanteer pointed out the hasty attack is used as the base line for assessment in the army. The seven section battle drills, the platoon and cbt tm hasty attack are all the same. They rely on an enemy situation of an isolated enemy element (det, section, platoon) that operates in a very predictable way with little freedom of action. Essentially a training aid. As part of this the friendly force is generally pretty well positioned and don't need to worry about enemy IDF or air, and our air and IDF are free to operate. This situation leads us to do things like dismounting on the objective.
Now, if this is the situation you face in real life, then, maybe, dismounting on the objective might work. The problem is that habitually doing this creates built in assumptions, and little high end force on force training means that even in a situation where dismounting on the objective might not be appropriate there is few repurcussions.... the assault goes through, the enemy dies or runs away, and we can chalk up another win for team blue.
So, understanding our institution, how we assess, and how little high fidelity training we get, what are the best assumptions to build into the force? I think this is the crux of the argument, and I think this is where we need to build in a bias for a dismount short of the objective. Specifically, I'd probably suggest a point short of SRAAW range, covered and concealed, probably 300-500m from the objective depending on how the enemy is equipped. Dismounted infantry should be able to cover this distance in 9-15 mins (and probably faster) which isn't an unreasonable amount of time for suppression. Like our preference for training for conventional operations, we can always ramp down in intensity and dismount closer to the objective if the enemy is genuinely neutralised or lacking in anti armour firepower. The default should be to dismount short of the objective outside SRAAW range.
I'm not as wedded to whether or not the LAVs accompany the infantry or not. The presence of the 25mm is of course tempting but I see a few tasks, like flank security that they could go do vice coming on to the objective with the infantry. If the LAVs come along with the infantry then it's another 8-15 vehs that the infantry must protect while also fighting through the objective. LAV Company Tactics identifies protected mobility as the primary role for the LAV, after that is fire support for dismounted infantry, followed by destroying other light AFVs. So, getting the infantry there safe is the most important thing, then they can provide fire support, and they don't need to do that side by side the dismounts.
Like Infanteer pointed out the hasty attack is used as the base line for assessment in the army. The seven section battle drills, the platoon and cbt tm hasty attack are all the same. They rely on an enemy situation of an isolated enemy element (det, section, platoon) that operates in a very predictable way with little freedom of action. Essentially a training aid. As part of this the friendly force is generally pretty well positioned and don't need to worry about enemy IDF or air, and our air and IDF are free to operate. This situation leads us to do things like dismounting on the objective.
Now, if this is the situation you face in real life, then, maybe, dismounting on the objective might work. The problem is that habitually doing this creates built in assumptions, and little high end force on force training means that even in a situation where dismounting on the objective might not be appropriate there is few repurcussions.... the assault goes through, the enemy dies or runs away, and we can chalk up another win for team blue.
So, understanding our institution, how we assess, and how little high fidelity training we get, what are the best assumptions to build into the force? I think this is the crux of the argument, and I think this is where we need to build in a bias for a dismount short of the objective. Specifically, I'd probably suggest a point short of SRAAW range, covered and concealed, probably 300-500m from the objective depending on how the enemy is equipped. Dismounted infantry should be able to cover this distance in 9-15 mins (and probably faster) which isn't an unreasonable amount of time for suppression. Like our preference for training for conventional operations, we can always ramp down in intensity and dismount closer to the objective if the enemy is genuinely neutralised or lacking in anti armour firepower. The default should be to dismount short of the objective outside SRAAW range.
I'm not as wedded to whether or not the LAVs accompany the infantry or not. The presence of the 25mm is of course tempting but I see a few tasks, like flank security that they could go do vice coming on to the objective with the infantry. If the LAVs come along with the infantry then it's another 8-15 vehs that the infantry must protect while also fighting through the objective. LAV Company Tactics identifies protected mobility as the primary role for the LAV, after that is fire support for dismounted infantry, followed by destroying other light AFVs. So, getting the infantry there safe is the most important thing, then they can provide fire support, and they don't need to do that side by side the dismounts.
