Toward Agile Procurement for National Defence: Matching the Pace of Technological Change
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Conclusion: Trust and Accountability
No matter what agile initiatives are put in place, they will only succeed if a still larger change in culture is embraced, one that rethinks trust and accountability in defence procurement. The current procurement system, with its many checks, gates, and procedures, is the result of controls and oversight mechanisms being introduced to address distrust between ministers, central agencies, and departments involved in major procurements. This distrust is understandable. There have been significant errors in the past and no government wants to face the media and opposition criticism when projects involving millions or billions of dollars go bad. Whenever there has been a failure or mishap, it has been attractive to add additional layers of oversight and procedure, including deputy-level committees, independent reviews, and external audits. And while these measures have arguably reduced risk and increased confidence, they ensure that the procurement system remains rigid. Evidently, a rigid system is not one that is well-placed to accept agile approaches, particularly if they involve higher risk tolerance and greater delegation.
Indeed, no tangible improvements to Canadian defence procurement timelines will be possible unless enough trust is restored to loosen the constraints that permeate the system. Rather than waiting for trust to be revived, however, it will be necessary to build it back up by accepting a trade-off between risk and results, and by accepting that failure is part of the learning process, not a reason to stop moving forward. Certain efforts have already been put in place, including the setting of a long-term investment plan agreed to by the finance and defence departments, the adoption of accrual accounting for the defence budget, and a move toward risk-based authorities.
These are promising initiatives and they must be built upon. DND/CAF will need to be given the authority and flexibility to try out different approaches that allow them to acquire and modernize capabilities with greater speed and regularity. These approaches might include:
Evergreen umbrella projects for ongoing capability improvements where funding can be reallocated among sub-projects by project sponsors.
A ‘colour of money’ between Vote 1 and Vote 5 for high technology acquisitions that has the flexibility of Vote 1 but the funding levels and ability to acquire new capability of Vote 5.
A fast-tracked approval and contracting processes for technological and regulatory upgrades (allowing them to skip or reduce the number of gates they must pass within DND/CAF’s governance boards and/or at the Treasury Board), with high flexibility in terms of initial budgets and schedules.
This will inevitably lead to false starts, mistakes, and errors. But as long as DND/CAF are open and transparent about what went wrong and how they are learning from the errors --that they accept to be accountable for their broadened responsibilities-- it may be possible to discover mechanisms and approaches that will enable Canada to keep pace with rapid technological change in the defence sector. To be blunt, considering the government’s current priorities, trust in exchange for transparency will do far more to improve defence procurement than a single agency will.
While this suggestion may appear fanciful at best and inconceivable at worst, the alternative is not sustainable or cost-effective. The Canadian military will increasingly need to acquire and maintain systems that depend on constantly evolving software and technological innovations. Rigid procedures will continue to act as an impediment to the timely procurement of these capabilities, which will degrade the operational relevance of the CAF and options available to government. Bestowing greater trust in exchange for clearer accountability may not be sufficient to avoid this outcome, but it is necessary...
About the Authors
Kalen Bennett is an MA student at the Norman Patterson School of International Relations in Security and Defence Policy. His research focuses have included political philosophy, populism, the European Union, and defence procurement.
Major-General (Retired) Doug Dempster served as the Defence strategic planner, and later as NATO Assistant Secretary General for Executive Management and head of the Centre for Executive Leadership at the University of Ottawa.
Philippe Dumas est doctorant à l’École nationale d’administration publique (ENAP). Sa thèse porte sur les projets d’acquisition de chasseurs au Canada depuis les années 1980.
Caroline Leprince is a policy analyst with the Canada Border Services Agency. She previously held positions in the federal public service in the areas of national security, cyber security, and public safety. Caroline is dedicated to promoting women’s leadership in the field of security and defence. As such, she sat on the board of WIIS-Canada from 2016-2017 before holding the position of executive director from 2018-2019. Caroline is an associate fellow with the Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies and the International Centre for the Study of the Profession of Arms. Her work has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including in International Journal and Études Internationales, and she has contributed to edited volumes on Canada’s foreign policy.
Kim Richard Nossal went to school in Melbourne, Beijing, Toronto, and Hong Kong and attended the University of Toronto, receiving his PhD in 1977. In 1976 he joined the Department of Political Science at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, where he taught international relations and Canadian foreign policy, serving as chair of the Department in 1989–90 and 1992–1996. In 2001, he went to Queen’s University, heading the Department of Political Studies until 2009. He served as director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy from 2011 to 2013. From 2013 to 2015, he was the executive director of the Queen’s School of Policy Studies.
David Perry is the Vice President, Senior Analyst and a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. He is the host of the weekly Defence Deconstructed Podcast and author of multiple publications related to defence budgeting, transformation and procurement. He is also a columnist for the Canadian Naval Review. He received his PhD in political science from Carleton University where his dissertation examined the link between defence budgeting and defence procurement. He is an adjunct professor at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and a research fellow of the Centre for the Study of Security and Development at Dalhousie University.
William Richardson recently completed his Master’s studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. His research focuses include western air power, interoperability and defence procurement. He currently works as a policy analyst at Global Affairs Canada.
Elinor Sloan is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa, and is a former defence analyst with Canada’s Department of National Defence. She is a graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada (BA), the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton (MA), and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (PhD).
Craig Stone holds a BA in Economics from the University of Manitoba and an MA and PhD in War Studies (Defence Economics) from the Royal Military College of Canada. Dr Stone joined the academic staff at Canadian Forces College (CFC) as an Assistant Professor in the summer of 2005 after 29 years in the Canadian Forces, the last five at CFC in the Strategic Studies Directorate.
https://www.cgai.ca/toward_agile_procurement_for_national_defence_matching_the_pace_of_technological_change#Conclusion
