Right now the Canada's CBMGs consist of a hodge podge of mixed units equipped with LAV III's on the way for the infantry, M113s, some Coyotes, some Grizzlies and AVGP variants, some units are light infantry without vehicles, and a small number of tanks, about 20-30. This creates logistical nightmares and also costs a lot of money, becaue all units use the same armoured vehicles. A single baseline armoured vehicle will reduce VTech training costs and simplify parts procurement and shipping. In addtion LAV III is wheeled which costs less in terms of fuel and maintenance costs. The LAV III is much faster than any tracked vehicles for battlefield mobility. Tactical mobility across open ground is not however as good as a tank or the best tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), but is better than M113s. They do get stuck more easily in soft terrain such as swamps, deep snow, or very soft sand. They do carry about the same armour and firepower as most modern IFVs (the LAV III Kodiak equipped with add-on armour provides protection from up to 30mm rounds). It is also well known that wheeled IFVs provide better overall protection from mines and have a better combat survivability rate than tracked IFVs due to their wheeled nature. As well, one must remember that soft terrain is not the modern battlefield and it is highly unlikely to be so in the future with 75% plus of the worlds population living in urban areas where the tracked vehicles better tactical mobility in soft terrain does not exist. One must also remember that LAV III is not a tank and therefore should not be used as a tank, therefore new tactics and strategies need to be developed if an all wheeled fleet is adopted.

But what about tanks? A LAV III can not replace tanks. Yes, a LAV III can not fullfill the same role as a tank, because it is not designed to. However, Canada does not need tanks if adopted new tactics and strategies. Tanks are designed to be able to go toe to toe with other tanks. They are extremely expensive to procure, maintain, and to operate. They are also required in large numbers to be effective. Canada's small numbers of around 125 divided amongst three brigade groups and a tank training unit does not provide Canada with the capability to employ tanks. There is still a place on the modern battlefield for MBTs, but not in Canada's army. Canada by maintainin an ineffective MBT capability wastes valuable military finnacial resources that could got towards providing a small number of attack and heavly lift helicopters which are not needed in massive numbers. What would provide direct fire support for the infantry without tanks, missiles are far too expensive? A version of the LAV III equipped with a 105mm cannon turret, either conventional or low profile. It retain the baseline LAV III vehicle, thus providing logistics commonality, and the firepower of a MBT for direct-fire support. Is it not more vulnerable to anti-tank missles than an MBT. Yes, it is, but due to the proliferation of heavy anti-tank weapons that can easily defeat even the most heavily armoured tanks, including US M1A2 Abrams, heavy armour is just as vulnerable. It must be stressed that combat units will use new tactics and strategy that minimizes their weaknesses and maximizes their capabilities rather than utilizing strategies that were designed for a type of warfare that doesn't exist today.

In addition, it most be noted that Canadian have trouble understanding why we need tanks and all the modern tracked IFVs, SPHs, and support vehicles that go with them. And rightly so, why should Canadian's pay to equip a military to fight wars that require tanks and are not likely to occur and that they do not want us involved in. Massive tank battles are the dreams of the "glory" days of warfare. The real battles today are low to medium intensity wars, but high intensity combat (i.e. people are still shooting at you), and peace support operations (PSO) gone wrong that tanks can't get to fast enough before the shooting ends. Many countries that require PSOs by the UN or NATO soldiers to help stabilze the country will not accept heavily armoured tracked military units, because that is considered a loss of their control and sovereingty. Canada's military industry would also be benefited, becuase the LAV III is a Canadian vehicle that can be bought for uninflated prices due to a bulk buy and help in securing foreing military sales for friendly nations.

Without getting too deep into the weeds (I take issue with some of the "facts" above), think about this one.

Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80's in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit. The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about. It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role. Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.

Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them. Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.

Never happened, thank god.

Some parting thoughts:
1. Why continue spending funds to train reservists the fire the 76 mm gun on the cougar when the vehicle should never se operational deployment again? Why not replace the turret with the Delco turret of the LAV III and Coyote? This would train reservists in the same gunnery techniques as their regular force counter parts and make it easier to integrate them in to units preparing for overseas duty.
2. The Australian LAV-25s have the same Delco turrets as on our LAV III, except that some also have TOW launchers on either side of the turret. If Canada had chosen those turrets for the LAV III (or at least on one per Inf Plt) it could have greatly increased tank killing capacity and thereby reduced dependency on MBTs.

Not to mock you in particular, however it disappoints me when I hear someone adopt a quote from it at an O Gp or on a crse. I will engage them afterwards and ask them to elaborate, to which a normal response is a stunned blank look, or occasionally, some keen young officer or sect commander will strike up a conversation.

Clive Milner when the Bge Comd for 1 CMBG had a habit of throwing out the odd qoute, must of had the Coles Notes version.

"The Canadian Armed Forces recently updated all of its Leopard C-1 MBTs to Leopard C-2 standard. In my opinion, this is merely another round of wishful thinking that it has the equipment and therefore capablility to fight a modern mechanized war with heavy armour MBTs and supporting vehicle's. Even tankers must admit that the Leopard C-2 supported Combat Brigades, even if fully equipped with Leopard C-2s, could not go toe-to-toe with a brigade equipped with modern MBTs and supporting AFVs such as the Leopard II's and Marder's or T-80's and BMP-3's that had crew of similar training. Canadian crew's would be decimated, even by a smaller force. The Leopard C-2 is merely an improved vintage late 1950's tank design. Why pretend that Canada has mechanized combat brigade groups that can fight "with the best against the best", when clearly we are not equipped to do so and it is highly ulikely that Canada will ever be.
"Canada would be much wiser to embrace the the interim combat brigade groups that the US is scrambling to create and has just recently ordered 2000 plus LAV III from Canada based Diesel Division General Motors to equip three brigade groups plus spares for training and attrition. These brigades fast and highly mobile, although in some area's tracked vehicle's enjoy advantages such as in severly swampy terrain. They are essentially modern day cavalry brigades supported by substantial numbers of infantry and combat support units such as artillery. These brigades are of use in all war scenarios, even high intensity conflict where they are able to act as quick strike brigades. Although they aren not able to go toe-to-toe with a heavy armour brigade equipped with modern MBTs and AIFV's they can easily run away if they meet stiff opposition. Yes, Canada loses the capabilty to fight even in a very limited heavy armour battle, but is it likely that Canada ever would and since we aren't equipped to do so what person would want to. When or if MBTs are not utilized by the CF, it is even more unlikely that any politician or officer would ever put the military into a situation where they must go toe-to-toe with a well-equipped mechanized armour brigade group.

"The LAV III should be adopted as the sole armoured vehicle in the Canadian Armoured Forces due to its excellent combination of more than adequate tactical mobility and fighting capability and its exceptional strategic mobility. In a high intensity situation Canada could offer battle or combat brigade goups entirely equipped with LAV III vehicles to act as fast strike units where tracked vehicles are too slow, without losing world influence to allies because of riding on past actions (ie. Desert Storm). In medium to low intensity conflicts LAV III equipped brigades are far superior to their tracked counterparts. And in peackeeping scneario the vast majority of parites will have no problem with a well equipped wheeled combat brigade on their homeland, but the many countries will not accept heavily armoured vehicles, because they signal a loss of control to the conflicting parties. Also, when things get out of hand these brigades are able to hold their own. Just my thoughts. Please provide yours, as other critiques could improve improve mine or show mine to be wrong."

quote:

---

Originally posted by 2 Charlie:
Hi Brad,

Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80's in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit. The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about. It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role. Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.

Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them. Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.

Never happened, thank god.

Just an example of the shoe horn theory, totally unsuited and impractical, but, with a bit of fine staff work and doctrine tweeking, it would have made sense, to someone.

---

Remember the pictures of our first kick at the CAT trophy in Germany using borrowed Leopard 1A1's, Belgique I believe, they had the original round frying pan turret. Our tankers won.

Tadda, if you examine the turrets of the up grade to the C2, it is a 1A1 turret with a complete add on of angular bins and armour add on's.

We may have made them look aesthetically pleasing and give our iron fist the impression of new kit, but in reality folks, we have stepped back two generations for a turret.

Next up, with our shrinking Bge capabilities and the advent of the LAV family, there was talk of Two light Bge (LAV) Gps, with one back Heavy (tracked).

I personally feel that we should more to an "all LAV" type concept. This will standardize the army from the hodgepodge we have now. It will force a re-thinking of our doctrine and a rewrite of our tactics. In other words a complete re-working of the army from doctrine, tactics and training. I think this would be a good thing by bringing debate to the army and in the end grow from that debate.

Going wheeled in the long run decreases maintaince costs, standardizes training ( and being easier to cross train Regs and reserves). and because we are basically buying from one family of vehs we will be able buy more. (increasing our sustainability something we don't have now with the Leopards)

There is nothing wrong with us doing the- "deploy overseas and be capable of defeating lightly armed enemy forces or to delay heavy enemy forces (a la Western Europe defense against the red hoards) until additional forces could be shipped by boat from the US". This could become our new role, one which could well suit us. As a secondary role, it would be no problem having LAV Bde or Bn in the peacekeeping/making role either.

All other nations who have gone light and mobile and wound up in a shooting war did not do so well.

The Russians relied primarily on their BTR families in Afganistan, Chechnya, and several other regions. The numbers tell the truth, body bags do fit all sizes. The russians understand the need for a mix of track/wheeled, light/heavy.

We are getting into a doctrine that failed the US in Vietnam, light, fast, mobile.

It's nice to take a piece of ground, but you have to put something on that piece of terra firma to keep it. That is were the heavies pay off.

The LAV can do many rolls, which is great, but I question it's overhead protection and survivability on a sustained manouver warfare engagement. You can only shoot and skoot until the fat lady closes all the exits, then it turns in to a turkey shoot.

Read some of the other posts of late, get rid of the head sheds, rationalize our budget, get proper kit, get on with the job.

Choosing vehs and eqpt is a combination of many military factors (the threat and doctrine) vs society factors (culture, resources and politics). The Coyote (LAV II if you will) and LAV III are all a result of a combination of how the military and societal factor mix.

I'm a firm believer that the purchase of the LAV III was the correct one for Canada and for the Army. It provides mix of protection, firepower and mobility at a fraction of the cost of a mechanized force. Considering the missions we've been on in the last decade the LAV III will give us a capability that we've never had before.

If the threat against Canada changes, our eqpt and doctrine can change as well.