Re: Maj/Gen R Rohmer/Monty
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Posted by Brad Sallows from Burnaby BC Canada on April 20, 2021 at 14:28:27:
In Reply to: Maj/Gen R Rohmer/Monty posted by Jules Deschenes on April 19, 2021 at 19:31:17:
Some people worship Montgomery; others seem to despise him. I'm still forming my own opinions as I learn
more, and more new information comes to light by the efforts of historians (who in turn fall into two
groups - the objective reporters/analysts, and those with their own axe to grind). If every operation Monty
planned after Alamein failed, then I surmise the Axis withdrew to Tunisia on their own terms. What exactly
does "failed" imply - that defeat resulted, or rather that the aims of each operation were too optimistic
at the outset?
As to Normandy, the expectations of hindsight never cease to amaze me. It is entirely possible that the
Allies might have broken out sooner, or rather it seems so to anyone who has the war diaries and strength
returns sitting in front of them to tell them how strong the respective forces were at any point in time.
Do people forget the uncertainty and risk faced by the Allied commanders, gambling on the weather and
believing they might be defeated on the waterline, to the extent that Eisenhower drafted a statement for
the eventuality of failure? Being defeated in 1944 would've meant not trying again until 1945, and caution
was therefore a necessity. The Allies knew at that time it wouldn't be a simple matter of landing and
racing for Paris, and it wasn't. The build up of Allied forces was limited by harbour capacity, and the
Germans were pouring divisions into Normandy almost as fast as the Allies. The Allies couldn't simply break
out in a few days because the Germans were not cooperating. Monty's only failing in Normandy, in my opinion,
was his unwillingness to admit that the battle plan he adapted to was not what he originally intended.
Specifically, he claimed that it was his intent all along to fix the bulk of the German armour on the left
while the Americans manoeuvred on the right, whereas documentation on record indicates he originally envisioned
the left flank as the breakout force. The truth is that once the Germans became fixated on Caen, he recognized
the impracticality of the original concept and changed plans - hardly the hallmark of an unsuccessful commander.
Thereafter, all the British/Canadians had to do was apply sufficient pressure to encourage the German armour
to remain concentrated on that flank and wait for the Americans to overcome their difficulties (the US infantry
was, reasonably, finding it a disheartening experience slogging through the bocage). In the event, the COBRA
offensive was not necessarily expected to be the breakout it became, but it was exploited rapidly by the Americans.
Finally, it wasn't Monty alone who decided the fate of the Falaise Gap. For his own reasons, Omar Bradley wanted
Patton to hold at a certain point, and in fact it was after discussion that closing of the gap was made primarily
a British/Canadian responsibility.
In summary, anyone who opines that Monty could've just walked ashore, shovelled the Germans aside in a couple of
weeks (despite having only near parity in combat force on the ground), and proceeded to Paris needs to rethink their
position.
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